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This thesis conducts an extensive literature review of prior studies on the three 
major commissioning programs for United States naval officers – the United States Naval 
Academy, Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps, and Officer Candidate School.  Three 
areas are covered:  historical patterns in officer accessions and historical changes in Navy 
pre-commissioning training and education philosophy and policy; cost comparisons of 
the three major commissioning programs; and comparisons of job performance of junior 
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continues to be the primary source of officer accessions during periods of reduced officer 
requirements in the Navy.  Additionally, it finds that, while all naval officers perform 
superbly, U.S. Naval Academy graduates generally tend to have an advantage in 
performance during various points of their career.  Due to this retention and performance 
differential, the larger initial cost of the education of Naval Academy graduates tends to 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The United States Navy spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually to 
educate and train candidates for commissioning as officers.  The United States Naval 
Academy (USNA), Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC), and Officer 
Candidate School (OCS) are the three major commissioning sources of Unrestricted Line 
Officers (URLs), the primary war-fighting community of the service.  The Navy strongly 
desires to procure officers with the highest potential of success as leaders in combat. 
Instruction in the art and science of warfare through training and education is the 
time tested method for molding combat leaders.  Training provides the means to complete 
a job or an assignment.  It can be given directly to an individual or to a larger group or 
unit.  Education provides for intellectual development and the cultivation of wisdom and 
judgment in an officer.  It also provides the ability to deal with situations unrelated to job 
assignment and prepare officers for even greater future responsibilities (Masland and 
Radway, 1957). 
In our nation’s history, periods of intense debate have occurred over how to most 
effectively educate and train midshipmen to become commissioned officers.  Over time, 
the Naval Academy, ROTC, and OCS became the three major commissioning programs.  
The current period of debate, starting with the Cold War drawdown, has prompted 
various government agencies to investigate which of the three commissioning sources is 
the “best” program from which to acquire officers.  Additionally, the post-war drawdown 
immediately reduced the number of officers graduating from ROTC and OCS, which 
shifted the composition or “mix” of officers in the fleet to a larger percentage of 
Academy graduates.  The two-fold debate continues in the Navy and federal government:   
what is the most efficient way in which to commission officers, and what comprises the 
proper “mix” of officers in the fleet from the three commissioning programs. 
A. BACKGROUND   
Each of the three major commissioning sources has different roles in officer 
production.  When comparing the three sources, these different roles provide each 
program with distinct advantages and disadvantages in cost, proficiency, and 
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organization.  Ideally, after completing a four year commitment to rigorous physical trials 
and a difficult educational course load, individuals who graduate from the Naval 
Academy will hold aspirations to remain in the Navy for long-term careers.  ROTC 
provides future officers the freedom to choose the college or university of their choice, 
yet still graduate from that institution as a commissioned officer in the United States 
Navy.  After receiving a college degree from the institution of their choice, OCS provides 
future officers with a short, rigorous training program designed to move officers quickly 
to the fleet.  The flexibility of the OCS program allows officer production to be raised or 
lowered at a moment’s notice, especially during periods of national emergency (Parcell, 
2005).  Ultimately, each of the commissioning sources plays a different, but vital role to 
the nation’s defense. 
As work continues to determine which is the most effective and efficient 
commissioning source, the importance of this search will only intensify in the coming 
decades.  The growing cost of Social Security, Medicare, and interest on the national debt 
will put severe future strains on the federal budget.  Only comprising 10% of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in 2004, these expenses are forecasted to reach 35% of the GDP 
by 2040 with the extension of the current tax laws (GAO, 2006).  Therefore, the three 
commissioning sources should be prepared to justify their existence and importance to 
our national defense.   
To be sure, governmental and “watch-dog” organizations are constantly 
evaluating the cost effectiveness of programs such as the three commissioning sources.  
In the end, these watch-dog groups, as well as the Federal government, are interested in 
the answer to one question:  how efficient are these three sources in producing naval 
officers?  The Naval Academy, which provides a four year degree, housing and other 
living expenses, as well as a small monthly stipend, requires a hefty expense in order to 
produce naval officers.  The Federal government also pays for a four year degree for 
ROTC scholarship students, including room and board.  Some ROTC programs at private 
colleges come with a large price tag.  However, ROTC students at public universities, 
which are heavily subsidized by the respective state governments (through taxes, 
lotteries, and even oil/mining royalties in some cases), have their tuition somewhat 
reduced, which in turn further reduces the cost to the Federal government. Because there 
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will always be agencies, watch-dog groups, and Members of Congress looking for ways 
to reduce federal expenditures, the Navy’s commissioning programs will remain in the 
spotlight for reduction or removal well into the future. 
Our country, however, must acquire future leaders to defend the nation.  Because 
the Navy is competing directly with the corporate world for officer candidates, it needs a 
reliable framework to provide strategies, insight, and information in order to compete for, 
produce, and retain, officers.  A number of scholars have completed research on the 
commissioning programs to provide such a framework by assessing whether or not the 
programs are attaining their goals.  Prior research includes historical and economic 
analyses, as well as analyses of the job performance of officers produced by each 
program.  During wartime, producing many officers quickly was the main goal.  At 
present, officer quality, with retention being a close second, appears to be the goal. 
 History remains a critical component when studying the fluctuating debate within 
the Navy regarding the best source for commissioned officers.  Often, the results 
depended on presidential administrations, Congress, public opinion, and the needs of the 
Navy.  Further, the role of education helped shaped the debate, because the percentage of 
the officer corps with college degrees changed as well.  In 1925, almost the entire officer 
corps had a bachelor’s degree. However, in 1956, only 56% of commissioned officers 
had a bachelor’s degree, and this rate would not break 95% again until 1980 (Thirtle, 
2001). 
In the civilian world, graduates of colleges and universities work for a vast range 
of companies with extremely diversified pay scales, promotion schedules, and 
performance evaluation systems.  In contrast, all graduates of the commissioning 
programs serve the same employer: the United States Navy.  Therefore, with established 
performance measures across the organization, job performance in the fleet can be 
evaluated.  Despite having diversified personnel (i.e. in terms of college backgrounds), 
the Navy levels the playing field by holding each officer accountable to the same 
standards and performance measures.  Thus, the Navy makes for a great environment in 
which to study the impact of college selection as it relates to future job performance.     
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Finally, new economic comparisons of the commissioning programs have been 
developed, which compare marginal and average costs with post-commissioning costs.   
During the early 1990s, significant congressional debate focused on the total cost of each 
commissioning source.  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) (now called the Government Accountability Office) deemed 
the service academies to be cost-ineffective commissioning sources.  The substantial 
lower pre-commissioning costs of NROTC and OCS led to proposals in Congress to 
close the Naval Academy.  Upon further consideration, Congress decided to limit the size 
of the Naval Academy to 4,000 midshipmen (GAO, 1992).   
In 1995, William Bowman changed the direction of the economic analysis of the 
commissioning sources with a “steady state” model of retention and promotion coupled 
with pre-commissioning and post-commissioning costs.  His model, with follow-on 
research by Steve Mehay at the Naval Postgraduate School and Ann Parcell at The Center 
for Naval Analyses, analyzed the cost-effectiveness of each commissioning source.  First, 
they evaluated the upfront costs of commissioning. Next, they projected the effectiveness 
of each source by predicting the job performance of its officers with a methodology based 
on the theory of human capital investment.  Their findings changed the policies of the 
Department of the Navy and Congress, with a return to the Cold War maximum of 4,400 
midshipmen at the Naval Academy, starting under the National Defense Authorization 
Act of 2003.    
B. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Objective 
The primary objective of this thesis is to analyze the three major accession 
programs for the United States Navy.  It is critical for the post-Cold War Navy to 
determine the most effective way to educate, train and retain its officers.  Failing to do so 
will have dire consequences.  For example, due to the Global War on Terror (GWOT), 
the military is currently struggling to meet all manpower requirements.  Finally, 
commissions from the USNA have increased and ROTC and OCS commissions have 
decreased.  The Navy is placing more Academy graduates in the fleet, thus altering the 
traditional equal shares of Academy, ROTC, and OCS graduates found during the Cold 
War.   
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2. Primary Research Question 
This thesis will conduct an extensive literature review of prior studies on the three 
major commissioning programs for naval officers.  Three areas will be covered:  
historical patterns in officer accessions and historical changes in pre-commissioning 
training and education philosophy and policy; cost comparisons of the three major 
commissioning programs; and comparisons of job performance of junior and field grade 
officers from each program.  The primary purpose of this research is to derive the 
implications of the results of the literature review for current Navy accession policies 
with respect to officer commissioning programs.  The broad-based insight provided by 
these comparisons will assist decision makers in reevaluating current policy toward the 
major commissioning programs.  Contrasts and comparisons are made among the many 
prior studies, and they are synthesized to generate recommendations for Navy policy 
makers.   
3. Secondary Research Questions 
Following the initial primary research question, secondary questions will be 
analyzed.  These questions include:   
 a. How did Naval Officer accession policy evolve over time?  What training 
philosophies guided officer accessions policy? 
 
 b. Historically, what proportions of Naval Officers were provided by the 
Naval Academy, Naval ROTC, and OCS? 
 
 c. How does performance vary by commissioning source? 
 
 d. What different economic indicators of cost-effectiveness are available and 
how do they vary among commissioning sources? 
 
 e. Do historical, performance, and economic analyses lead to 
recommendations regarding how to assist decision makers in officer accession policy? 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis consists of: (1) an extensive literature review, 
and (2) an evaluation of the research results on officer accession programs.  The 
implications for accession policy will be derived from historical, performance, and 
economic data on the commissioning programs obtained from the prior studies.  Each 
element provides a wealth of information, which provides decision makers with a through 
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analysis regarding the most effective and efficient way to train future officer candidates.  
There are only a few historical, performance-based, and economic analyses regarding 
officer accessions, but collectively, they offer a large reservoir of insight for decision 
makers.  
1. Historical Analysis 
The historical comparison will examine the histories of the Naval Academy, 
ROTC and OCS programs, which will explain the reasoning for their development.  
Additionally, the comparison will determine whether or not each source is still being 
employed according to its established goals, or if it experienced a change in goals over 
time.  Compared to the Naval Academy and ROTC, there are few historical resources 
available on OCS, which creates a bias in the research.  Further, Department of Defense 
and Bureau of Naval Personnel records on commissioning sources only go back to 1949.  
Therefore, prior to 1949, historical studies will provide the primary source of information 
on the commissioning sources.   
The historical comparison will first examine the British and early American Navy 
in order to study pre-Naval Academy education and training of naval officers.  The 
historical analysis will conclude with present day education and training programs.  All 
available research will be assembled, with the goal of enlightening decision makers 
regarding previous studies of commissioning sources.  The research will also evaluate 
historical documents and Department of Defense data in order to study the historical 
“mix” of USNA, ROTC, and OCS graduates in the fleet.   
2. Performance Analysis 
The performance analysis will first provide background information on military 
and civilian performance indicators used in the context of internal labor markets of an 
organization.  This will highlight the ways in which Navy performance has been 
evaluated:  e.g., based on retention, promotion, fitness reports, and post-commissioning 
training success.   Studying these performance measures will enable decision makers to 
determine if the ways in which each commissioning source prepares their graduates for 
service as commissioned officers are effective.    
The thesis will gather available research that addresses each performance 
indicator for each commissioning program.  The data will be limited to studies completed 
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after 1994 and include analysis of officer performance after the end of the Vietnam War 
in order to limit the focus solely on the All-Volunteer Navy.  The results of each report 
will be discussed.  Finally, the comparison will present the results of the collection of 
reports.   
3. Economic Analysis 
The economic analysis will be based on the “theory of human capital investment” 
in order to provide the framework for evaluating the commissioning programs.  
Commissioning programs provide education and training for employees with the promise 
of a payoff in terms of improved productivity over a long period of employment.  
Improved worker productivity and the associated monetary savings constitute the 
economic benefits of the education or training program.  The analysis will first address 
the importance of this model.  Next, it will discuss the research available on the costs of 
the commissioning programs, and how those costs are estimated.  The comparison will 
present the overall results of the collection of reports.  A possible bias is the lack of 
comparability in the methodology of each research study.         
Additionally, the report will analyze other education programs funded by the 
Federal government and the Department of Defense.  Although the responsibility of 
education is delegated to the states by the Tenth Amendment, Federal educational 
spending allows further assistance to states to boost national primary/secondary/post-
secondary educational goals, as a human capital investment to improve the U.S. 
workforce.  The three commissioning sources are part of the Federal government’s 
expenditures on education, and Chapter Two will illustrate the vital role of education in 
America’s national defense.  The Constitution assigns the responsibility of national 
defense to the Federal government. Therefore, theoretically, commissioning education 
becomes one of the priorities of federal educational spending. 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis will focus solely on the United States Navy, despite the fact that the 
Naval Academy provides 15%-20% of each graduating class to the United States Marine 
Corps.  Additionally, the thesis will limit the commissioning source evaluation to only 
the URL graduates of the Naval Academy, ROTC, and OCS, and will omit other enlisted 
commissioning programs.  Generally, URL officers are the main combat body of the 
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officer corps, so the primary mission of the Academy, ROTC, and OCS is to produce 
large numbers of this officer type.  Although several enlisted-to-officer programs exist, 
they mainly funnel their graduates into technically specific groups in the restricted line 
community as Warrant Officers and Limited Duty Officers.  Typically, enlisted personnel 
desiring commissions in the URL are encouraged to apply to the main three 
commissioning sources. 
  The important effect of direct enlisted commissions will be looked at in the 
historical review, but not analyzed in the performance or economic comparison.  These 
types of commissions are popularly known as “battlefield commissions,” and they 
provide direct commissions of enlisted directly into the unrestricted line.  Generally, they 
are only in effect in a time of war, and done in large quantities.  However, after Korea, 
they Navy allowed a number of enlisted personnel to be commissioned without entering a 
commissioning program.  By the end of the Cold War, all enlisted personnel desiring 
commissions were required to enter some type of commissioning program.     
The main limitation on this report is the lack of availability of research that 
addresses each individual element of study in the history, performance, and economic 
categories.  The principles and models are relatively new and have had few follow on 
studies, particularly in the areas of job performance and economics.  However, the 
research is sufficiently detailed and comprehensive to provide decision-makers with a 
broad view of accession implications based on several perspectives. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The historical background and analysis will be reviewed in Chapter II.  Secondly, 
the job performance background and analysis will be reviewed in Chapter III.  Next, the 
economic background and analysis will be reviewed in Chapter IV.  Finally, Chapter V 
will synthesize the results of the three different comparisons, integrate generalizations, 
and provide conclusions and recommendations that can be derived from the analysis of 





II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
This thesis chapter will analyze past patterns in officer accessions.  It will explore 
chronological changes in pre-commissioning training and education philosophy and 
policy.  Included in this analysis are the factors and events which drove senior policy 
makers to formulate those changes.  A historical graph is presented that compares the 
accession sources during periods of peace and war.  The intent is to derive lessons from 
the past with regard to how officer accession programs have evolved over time. 
  Technology and mass mobilization appear to steer naval history and strategic 
policy (Hacker, 1994).  Therefore, this chapter is focused on these two key items.  As it 
emerged from the age of sail to the advent of nuclear power and computers, it became 
clear that there would always be a complex, symbiotic relationship between technology 
and the success of the Navy.  The nature and advancements of technology is ever-
changing.  Therefore, the Navy must require that officers have a high level of intelligence 
and education.  Additionally, mass mobilization during times of crisis requires the means 
to rapidly acquire officers.  During some wars, the Navy underwent phenomenal 
transformation by rapid expansion due to the need to quickly acquire officers.  Thus, 
technology and mass mobilization play a large role in the historical analysis.     
A. OFFICER ACCESSIONS IN THE PRE-MODERN ERA (1500 – 1850):  
THE DECLINE OF TARPAULIN SAILORS AND THE RISE OF THE 
EDUCATED OFFICER     
The navies of the Pre-Modern Era were the precursors to the modern navies of 
today.  The European powers gradually recognized the necessity of a standing, 
professional Navy to provide constant protection for the homeland, support for distant 
colonies, and safe passage of seaborne trade.  This recognition led to the development of 
a professional officer corps to lead the new navies.  As the era progressed, the navies 
became less dependent on experienced sailors, and more dependent on the educated class 
to become officers.  During this time, only nobility or gentry could afford any kind of 
education.   
This era ushered in early technological advances such as improved naval 
architecture, ship handling, gunnery, and navigation.  It grew very slowly during this era, 
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not at the rapid pace seen later during the Industrial Revolution.  The strategic process of 
mass mobilization (total war) would not be developed until the American Civil War.  
Instead of the entire nation, only armed service members participated in war.  Battles and 
wars were fought by large armed forces on the European continent or in localized 
regional actions to support colonies.  Either on the continent or out in distant colonies, the 
navies fought with minimal civilian participation or impact (Karsten, 1972).      
1. British Naval Influence (1500 – 1800) 
In the early 16th century, the modern navies acquired officers from the ranks of 
enlisted sailors, who had worked their way up to command.  These officers are known as 
“tarpaulin” sailors.  They were from very modest families, but were highly experienced 
with ship handling and naval warfare.  The respective navies of the world powers grew in 
size and importance as colonial interests expanded all over the world.  With the naval 
growth in the 16th century, the nobility and gentry felt compelled to increase their 
presence in the officer corps.  Due to distrust and the perceived equalization of the social 
classes, they disliked the “lower sort of men” in charge of the maritime force (Karsten, 
1972). 
The Puritan Revolution (1640-1660) and the Dutch Wars (1652-1678) led 
England to establish a permanent national navy with a professional officer corps.  It 
became the Royal Navy in 1660 under Charles II.  The Royal Navy became essential in 
the defense of the island nation and the protection of merchant interests across the globe.  
Though a law issued in 1677 created minimum qualifications for a commission in the 
Royal Navy, all officers’ training was still completed at sea.  By the late 1600s, England 
had become a world leader in trade, with vast colonial interests supported by the Royal 
Navy (Karsten, 1972).           
In the early 18th century, the “tarpaulin” sailor found it ever increasingly difficult 
to advance in the Navy of the British Empire (Karsten, 1972).  Most officer candidates 
were coming from the more educated class of the nobility and gentry because they could 
provide for their own education.  However, to further enhance naval officer education 
and prepare officers for naval service, the British Navy established the Royal Navy 
Academy in 1733.  It was formed at Portsmouth, and became the Royal Navy’s first 
officer training school ashore (Simons, 2000). 
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By the start of the American Revolution, “tarpaulin” sailors were almost 
eliminated.   New officers were trained either directly in the fleet or they entered the 
Royal Navy Academy at Portsmouth.  Some merchant captains could receive 
commissions, but only with political influence.  The Napoleonic Wars and other national 
emergencies forced the British Navy to commission more “tarpaulin” sailors, but only for 
the duration of hostilities. 
  By 1800, the percentage of nobility and gentry in the British Officer Corps 
climbed to 93.3 percent (Karsten, 1972).  Only wealthy families could afford the 
education required to become an officer.  The professional officer corps led the British 
Navy to become the undisputed naval superpower by 1805.  Ultimately, this naval 
strength enabled the British Empire to become the most extensive empire in world 
history. 
2. The Early American Navy (1776 – 1812)    
The American Navy was heavily influenced by the British Navy.  It incorporated 
many of the British Navy’s values and traditions (Karsten, 1972; Simons, 2000).  The 
ships of the War of Independence were officered by veterans of the Royal Navy or the 
merchant service, including some officers from the lower social classes.  As in the British 
Navy, the “tarpaulin” officer was a rare commodity in the new United States Navy, 
particularly during periods of peace (Karsten, 1972).   
Like the British Navy model, the United States Officer Corps was limited to those 
who had financial and political influence.  Many of the Federalist founders believed that 
only suitable individuals, who had developed the “right habits, principles, and feelings 
(Karsten, 1972, Pg 4)” should be appointed to positions of authority in the Naval Service. 
Often, senior naval officers would bring their nephews, sons, or grandsons up the ranks 
with them.  Further, fierce competition for limited midshipmen appointments led directly 
to the requirement for political influence. The struggle for an appointment was so great, 
that by 1833, Secretary of the Navy, Levi Woodbury, reported that with only 35 
midshipman vacancies available, there were more than 1,300 applications on file 
(Karsten, 1972). 
12 
Following the American Revolution, midshipmen were appointed by the 
President, Secretary of the Navy, or members of Congress (Simons, 2000).  Unlike in the 
British Navy, the importance of shore-based training was not immediately recognized.  
The early American Navy mandated that both naval skills and regular academics be done 
at sea where personal experience could be amassed.  When studies were not taking place, 
midshipmen were rotated among various duty stations and assigned jobs under the close 
supervision of the Captain (Simons, 1965).    After sea training commenced, midshipmen 
would earn their commissions as naval officers.  Initially, chaplains were responsible for 
teaching general academics, but by 1812, Congress authorized that a schoolmaster be 
assigned to every ship to educate midshipmen (Simons, 2000).   
For the most part, midshipmen could only be appointed from wealthy families 
who could afford private education and wield political influence.  Like the British Navy, 
these practices kept control of the Navy in the hands of the upper social classes.  A critic 
of the time noted that the naval service was attempting to continue the linage and 
privilege of an aristocracy into the young democratic republic (Karsten, 1972).  
Nevertheless, the well-established practices of the British Navy influenced the American 
Navy to keep the traditional commissioning method of officers among the elite, with 
“tarpaulin” sailors filling vacancies during times of war.   
3. The Need for an American Naval Academy (1812 – 1845) 
The War of 1812 led to the necessity for a firmer establishment of the naval 
service and a professional officer corps to lead it during peace time.  The naval victories 
at the Battles of Lake Erie and Lake Champlain, coupled with the numerous successes on 
the Atlantic, helped saved the young American democracy from defeat.  Beginning in 
1814, a succession of Navy secretaries, with the support of senior naval officers, 
proposed to Congress the creation of a shore-based naval academy.  Between 1814 and 
1842, three separate proposals to establish a Naval Academy died in Congress.  Lack of 
congressional support from the inland states prevented passage of the respective bills 
(Lovell, 1979).   
The impetus behind a move for a shore-based naval academy had its roots in 
practicality.  Too few competent educators sought to become schoolmasters at sea 
(Simons, 1965 and 2000).  Conditions on-board ships were not conducive to receiving a 
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formal education.  Midshipmen had little time for studies, as they were busy standing 
watches and completing other professional duties.  Classes could only be held behind 
canvass screens on the gun-decks, or in the poorly lit berthing decks.  Schoolmasters had 
little authority.  As a result, their students were constantly being interrupted to handle the 
ship’s duties, which were frequent on a bustling warship (Simons, 1965).   
Despite congressional resistance to another service academy, recognition of these 
problems urged the Navy to act independently and establish shore-based education.  The 
Navy set up temporary schools at Navy yards in Boston, New York, and Norfolk, and 
urged midshipmen to attend them while in port.  Beginning in 1838, midshipmen 
approaching their examinations for lieutenant reported to the Naval Asylum in 
Philadelphia for eight months of study.  At this first shore-based naval educational 
institution, the  schoolmasters would educate midshipmen in academic and professional 
seamanship courses (Simons, 1965 and 2000). 
In the 1840s, public pressure mounted for the creation of a Naval Academy, but 
Congress continued to resist.  West Point’s critics had dubbed it the “Nursery of 
Aristocrats”, and Congress was reluctant to create another such institution (Simons, 
1965).  Again, the Navy was forced to act independently.  Bypassing Congress in 1845, 
Secretary of the Navy, George Bancroft, teamed with Secretary of War, William L. 
March, and designated that Fort Severn in Annapolis be used as a naval school.  President 
Polk, who had demonstrated his pro-military and pro-Manifest Destiny leanings in a war 
with Mexico, approved the transfer.  His endorsement proved essential.  In October 1845, 
the Naval School was opened, and was subsequently renamed the United States Naval 
Academy in 1850 (Lovell, 1979). 
The Naval Academy finally gained Congressional recognition and appropriation 
on August 13th, 1846 due to three circumstances.  First, the American public became 
much more vocal in their disapproval of the alleged brutal and inhumane conditions on-
board ships.  Officers, who were often abused as midshipmen, became abusive to others 
as they climbed in rank (Simons, 1965).  Many saw enlightenment and education as the 
cure to ignorance. The goal was to break the cycle by preventing those abuses from 
perpetuating themselves into the future with a new breed of naval officers.  
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The second circumstance which enabled the formation of the Naval Academy was 
also in regard to public opinion.  Public attention fell on a highly controversial 
punishment of a midshipman who was hanged for allegedly inciting mutiny on-board the 
USS Somers with two other enlisted seamen.  A midshipmen / enlisted-recruit training 
ship, the USS Somers was crossing the Atlantic when rumors spread that Midshipman 
Phillip Spencer and other seamen planned to murder the officers and establish a pirate 
ship.  The midshipman turned out to be the son of Secretary of War John Spencer, and his 
subsequent execution ignited a wave of government and media criticism when the ship 
returned to port (Simons, 2000).  
Thirdly, as the intensity of the Industrial Revolution began to grow, the United 
States Navy was commissioning more steam-powered ships.  Many felt a strong technical 
education would be essential for commanding and operating these ships (Simons, 1965 
and 2000).   
4. The Foundations of the Naval Academy (1845-1850) 
The early curriculum at the Naval Academy incorporated many of the academic 
and administrative features developed by the Military Academy at West Point.  In 1851, 
the program was extended from two to four years, and control over most appointments 
was taken away from the executive branch and allocated among the congressional 
districts and territories (Simons, 2000).  While this division of appointments did 
distribute the benefits of a Naval Academy education among all of the states, it did not 
alleviate the criticism that control of the Navy was still in the hands of the social elite.  
As the upper-class maintained the greatest proportion of midshipmen appointments, 
political patronage was still considered essential for a career in the Navy.     
B. OFFICER COMMISSIONS IN THE EARLY MODERN ERA (1850 – 1941):   
THE NAVAL ACADEMY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF OFFICER 
CANDIDATE SCHOOL, AND THE REEMERGENCE OF THE 
“TARPAULIN” SAILOR   
With the establishment of the Naval Academy, formal education was now firmly 
implanted as the foundation in the making of a Naval Officer.  The educational 
foundation would grow exponentially as the as the Industrial Revolution gained strength 
during this period.  However, it was not until this period that the effects of mass 
mobilization would be felt.  Previously, nations kept small standing armies and navies to 
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handle lesser wars and support colonial and imperial interests.  During this period, history 
saw the development of mass mobilization, where all of the nation’s resources, including 
population, factories, and machines were mobilized to fight. 
Because the American Civil War employed mass mobilization, it is considered by 
many historians to be the first modern war in history.  Although mostly a major land 
battle fought between armies, the Navy saw its mass mobilization.  Additionally, it was 
evident during this time period with the rapid expansion of the officer corps:  200 percent 
in the Spanish-American War, 600 percent in the Civil War, and 700 percent for WWI.  
However, when each of the respective hostilities ended, the Navy immediately returned 
to its pre-war strength of officers.  Despite a limited role in these wars, the United States 
recognized the ever increasing role of the Navy for national defense, and the need for a 
reserve Navy to augment during an emergency.  Most importantly, the Navy needed a 
source from which to draw naval officers in the event of a crisis.  
1. The Civil War and the Spanish - American War Period (1850-1899)  
The Naval Academy immediately became the sole provider of commissioned 
naval officers up to the Civil War (Karsten, 1972 and Simons, 2000).  By the beginning 
of the Civil War, most officers from the old “train at sea” Navy were replaced by 
Academy graduates.  All line officers came from the Naval Academy, while the Medical, 
Dental, and Chaplain Corps were manned with direct appointments from their respective 
professional schools.  The other staff communities (Supply Corps, etc) were manned by 
Naval Academy graduates, either directly from graduation, or after an initial tour as a line 
officer.  Less than one percent of the US Naval Officers between 1845 and 1901 rose 
from the enlisted force, but they were all pushed into the staff communities as pay 
masters, supply clerks, and other administrative jobs  (Karsten, 1972). 
At the onset of the Civil War, weaknesses in the Naval Academy supply system 
were immediately recognized.  Many midshipmen and officers left the service to join the 
Confederacy, which created a large officer deficit.  Additionally, a town insurgency 
forced the Naval Academy to temporary close and move to Rhode Island, further 
delaying production (Department of the Navy [DoN], 1863).  The Navy asked Congress 
to supply money for more infrastructure and midshipmen to correct the “deficiencies 
caused by the rebellion” (DoN, 1863, pg xxviii). 
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As the war continued to escalate in size and strength, the Navy, and the world, 
saw the beginning of mass mobilization.  The officer corps would grow from 1,114 in 
1861 to 6,759 by 1865 – a growth rate of 606 percent in only four years (Bureau of Naval 
Personnel [BUPERS], 1960).    With the four year procurement of an officer, the Naval 
Academy could not come close to meeting the war time demands of the Navy (Karsten, 
1972). 
To compensate for the shortage, by Act of Congress, the Navy gave civilians 
temporary or “acting” appointments as commissioned officers (Karsten, 1972).  With 
deeply established maritime roots, New Englanders from the commercial and whaling 
fleets were recruited heavily for this new fighting force.  Close parallels can be seen 
between the recruitment, education, and training of the Merchant Marines and the 
modern-day Officer Candidate School.  In order to train the men recruited, the Navy set 
up schools to teach naval operations and gunnery.  By 1865, about 7,500 commissioned 
officers were comprised of either commercial sailors or civilians (DoN, 1865, pg xiii).  In 
1863, in their annual report to Congress, the Navy Department praised the volunteer 
officers for their courage and skill (DoN, 1863). 
 Even though the officers fought with “zeal and fidelity” (DoN, 1865, pg xiii), 
most of the temporary appointments were withdrawn after the war (Karsten, 1972).  The 
Navy was resolute that the Naval Academy should be the only source for the procurement 
of officers, and the post-war Navy would continue the Naval Academy foundation (DoN, 
1863).  Strangely, the board of visitors at the Naval Academy became a surprise critic in 
recommending the disestablishment of the Academy into seven smaller schools.  Perhaps 
due to the regional nature of the Civil War, the board felt that having seven schools 
situated in different parts of the country would alleviate the problem of supply system 
break-down in the event of another regional crisis.   However, Congress authorized the 
return of the Naval Academy back to Annapolis in 1864, (Lovell, 1979) and it continued 
to be the sole source of commissioned officers at the war’s end (Karsten ,1972).   
The Spanish-American War was far less lengthy and significantly less bloody 
than the Civil War.  Nonetheless, the need to mobilize and expand the mobilization of the 
armed forces still led to a shortage of naval officers.  Some states had created naval 
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militias (as did the Army in the Civil War) as a rudimentary naval reserve, but only a few 
existed.   The state governors released all of their militia officers into the regular Navy, 
but the manpower was only a fraction of what was required (DoN, 1898).  The Navy was 
forced to bring in a number of volunteer officers into the service again for the duration of 
the war (Karsten, 1972). 
Once again, the Navy was forced to recruit officers from among the civilian 
population.  Instead of recruiting commercial sailors as during the Civil War, they looked 
for individuals with higher levels of education and intelligence (DoN, 1898).  The 
Industrial Revolution ushered in increasingly complicated technology.  Therefore, the 
officer of that era had to possess not only the sailing and battle skills of the previous era, 
but the education and intellect to master new technology. Though the new recruits lacked 
the experience to be of immediate valuable importance, they quickly acquired the 
knowledge they needed after their initial training.  The Navy Department found that all 
volunteer officers performed with great zeal and success during the war (DoN, 1898).     
After the close of the Spanish-American War, all volunteer officers were 
discharged from the service (DoN, 1899).  The Department of the Navy appreciated the 
service of the volunteer officers, but continued to believe that officers must be trained at 
the Naval Academy.  The department found that the volunteer officers performed to the 
best of their ability, but would have been “really efficient” with more training and time in 
service.  At the time, the Navy believed that the Academy graduate, with experience as a 
career officer, laid the foundation for success in the war (DoN, 1898). 
2. Post Spanish - American War to Pre-WWI (1899-1914) 
The Civil War and the Spanish-American War taught the Navy that the Naval 
Academy undoubtedly could not supply all of the officers needed during a major war.  
The volunteer forces proved to be an invaluable asset, but the Navy was not prepared to 
make them a permanent part of the Navy framework.  Once the hostilities ended, it was 
back to business as usual.  Once the war time commissions were terminated, the Naval 
Academy always emerged as the dominant commissioning source.  Undoubtedly, 
however, the seeds of change for the establishment of other commissioning sources had 
been planted by the successes of the volunteer officer.   
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Because the role of the Navy was paramount during the Spanish-American War, a 
“new-Navalism” swept through American culture. The United States emerged from the 
Spanish War as a major world power with extensive colonial interests all over the world 
(Lovell, 1979).  New ships, and officers to man them, were required to supply and protect 
the new-found colonial interests (Karsten, 1972).  Theodore Roosevelt, an ardent 
supporter of the Navy, held the presidency at this time.  In 1890, the American Navy was 
negligible as a naval power.  But by the end of the Roosevelt administration in 1909, the 
United States had one of the top three Navies in the world.  The Naval Academy mirrored 
this impressive naval expansion with large numbers of midshipmen and aggressive 
building projects (Lovell, 1979).   
During this build-up of naval strength, the Naval Academy could not keep up with 
the manpower requirements of the fleet.  The Navy continued to fight for more officers 
from the Academy, but started to look elsewhere (DoN, 1901 – 1905).  In the mean time, 
the aristocratic British and other European navies started to commission a growing 
number of “tarpaulin” sailors again.  The Navy of the American democratic republic 
continued to stall the commission of the “common man” (Karsten, 1972) as naval 
officers.  Finally, the shortage crisis led the Navy to request that enlisted personnel be 
granted commissions. 
In 1901, the government allowed the direct commission of six warrant officers, 
and that number was expanded to twelve two years later.  The “tarpaulin” sailors were 
receiving commissions again, but it still proved difficult.  The commissioning 
examinations were very difficult for the warrant officers who had no formal education.  
Most years, the twelve warrant officer commissions were under-filled or not filled at all 
due to examination failures (DoN 1901, 1903, 1905, 1906).  One critic of the time 
pointed out that an enlisted man could never hope to become a commissioned officer 
(Karsten, 1972).  The lack of a formal education clearly prevented the initial success of 
the program.        
3. WWI and the Creation of the Naval Reserve. (1914-1918) 
Following the Civil War, the Navy recognized the importance of mass 
mobilization and the significant need for a Naval Reserve for periods of crisis.  The 
officers and enlisted of such a reserve would become a quick source of trained and 
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educated manpower ready to serve in the regular Navy.  Many attempts, beginning as far 
back as 1887, were made to establish a permanent national naval reserve, but all failed in 
Congress (DoN, 1887; DoN, 1901; DoN 1912-1914).  A few states created their own 
naval militias, some of which saw action in the War with Spain.   
After hostilities erupted in 1914 in Europe, the importance of a naval reserve 
quickly gained recognition.  The Naval Militia Act of 1914 was passed to bring all state 
naval militias under the Navy Department.  Additionally, in 1916, the United States 
Naval Reserve was formed, but only included former active-duty officers and enlisted. 
Initially, the goal of the Naval Reserve was to organize prior active duty service members 
for immediate recall.  If the United States enters war, the naval reserve provides 
experienced officers to fill more senior positions (DoN, 1912-1916).      
The start of the European war led to the minor expansion of the active regular 
Navy.  Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels allowed the selection of fifteen enlisted 
men per year for entry to the Naval Academy in 1914 (Karsten, 1972).  This remarkable 
policy change would permit the enlisted to receive the education necessary to become an 
officer, something virtually unattainable prior to the policy change.  Again, the Secretary 
of the Navy requested that the size of the Naval Academy double and warrant officer 
commissions expand to 45 (DoN, 1916).  The length of the Naval Academy program was 
reduced to three years.  “Officer material schools” (candidate schools), whose curriculum 
lasted only four months, were established on Naval Academy grounds and on the 
campuses of several schools and universities (DoN, 1917).   
Following the declaration of war in 1917, the United States Navy began 
producing officers on a massive scale:  the Navy would grow from 4,000 officers in 1916 
to 28,000 officers in the beginning of 1919 (DoN, 1919).  Once again, the Navy realized 
that it could not solely rely on the Naval Academy for production of officers.  The Navy 
trained its expanded officer corps at its own instillations and at “officer material schools”, 
located at fourteen different colleges and universities around the nation (Lyons and 
Masland, 1959; DoN, 1918).  The intense courses offered by the material schools 
provided the officer candidates with just enough information to begin their naval careers. 
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Building on previous successes, direct enlisted commissions became a major accession 
source.  After some initial training, the enlisted force provided 11,000 commissioned 
officers during the war (DoN, 1918).    
The performance of the OCS graduates and enlisted during the war stood out 
significantly.  The Navy Department pushed to allow many OCS graduates to serve the 
duration of a career in the post-war Navy as regular commissioned officers.  For most, 
the temporary commissions were lifted and the officers were returned to the reserves and 
civilian life during the drawdown.    Even during hostilities, the Navy still considered the 
Naval Academy as the most important source of officers, “but the next best material is 
being provided [by the officer candidate schools]” (DoN, 1918) to the fleet.   
4. Between the World Wars        
At the end of the First World War, the Naval Academy again became the sole 
accession program of active duty line officers, which would last until 1941 (DoN 1920, 
1926; BoN, 1930-1941).  The only exception to this rule was the twelve annual warrant 
commissions, which were required by law (DoN, 1920).  Additionally, the Naval 
Academy had the production strength to make most staff officer requirements, except 
those physicians, dentists, and chaplains who were commissioned from their professional 
schools.   
However, the First World War signified the importance of education, even under 
the exceptional growth of mass mobilization.  Even though only twelve direct 
commissions existed, by 1918, one hundred enlisted men a year were entering the Naval 
Academy.  Additionally, the creation of the Naval Academy Preparatory School in 1920 
by then Undersecretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt helped prepare Sailors and 
Marines for entry into the Naval Academy.  This school would enable the “common 
man” to earn commissions in the Navy by fulfilling the education prerequisite required 
for entrance into the Naval Academy.   
Furthermore, the Knox-King-Pye Board of 1919 stressed the importance of 
education as a platform on which to build experience and knowledge.  The board 
evaluated the need for education and training of line officers, and how it could be 
accomplished.  Many officers believed that the prewar patterns of education and career 
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progression were not satisfactory.  They found that the Naval Academy should be the 
initial foundation for the career officer, focusing on training graduates to be division 
officers.  More intense and specific education, for expanded responsibilities, would be 
provided if the officer climbed in rank.  While the board recognized the importance of 
traditional at-sea, on-the-job training, education would be the foundation of the naval 
officer (Simons, 2000). 
Alerted by Japanese designs on China and the Western Pacific, the Navy became 
watchful of the officer manpower situation as early as 1926.  The Navy was convinced 
that Japan could become a major opponent in a large-scale naval war in the Pacific 
(Simons, 2000).  The Navy felt that an expanded reserve force would be the best route for 
traditional mobilization in the event of a major war.  As before, the more senior billets in 
the reserve could be filled by retiring and separating officers.  However, the expanded 
reserve would require educated officers for many junior billets.  At this point, education 
had become a regular and legitimate function of the armed services (Masland and 
Radway, 1957).   
As a result, the Naval Reserve Officer Training (NROTC) Program was 
established at six universities across the country to prepare reserve officers to lead a 
citizen navy mobilized in an emergency (Lyons and Masland, 1959).  A simple addition 
of naval science courses to their regular undergraduate degree programs would qualify 
students for a commission in the Naval Reserve (Simons, 2000).  All ROTC graduates 
entered the reserve, but had opportunities to pick up experience at sea for short durations.  
The only opportunities for regular commissions were after 1931, in which six accessions 
were granted into the Supply Corps (Bureau of Navigation [BoN], 1932, Masland and 
Radway, 1957).   
Even after the creation of the NROTC, the several Secretaries of the Navy 
continued to believe that the Naval Academy should be the only source for all line 
commissioned officers for the regular Navy.  Therefore, the Naval Academy would 
remain the sole source for officers.  The only exception, however, was the twelve warrant 
commissions (BoN, 1930-1940).  Most officers in the staff corps entered from the Naval 
Academy as well, either immediately after graduation or after building experience as a 
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line officer.  The only exceptions were six ROTC graduates entering the Supply Corps, 
one to three pay clerks commissioned into the Supply Corps, and officers entering the 
Medical Corps, Dental Corps, or the Chaplain Corps from their advanced professional 
training (BoN, 1930). 
By 1938, it became increasingly probable that the United States would enter the 
European war.  As a precaution, Naval Reserve began a major expansion as the United 
States entered the pre-mobilization phase of World War II.  In turn, NROTC grew with 
the addition of two more units.  By the end of 1941, the ROTC program had grown to 27 
units across the country (Lyons and Masland, 1959).  Despite massive growth, the Navy 
realized that even the NROTC program was not producing the amount of officers 
required for full-scale war (Thompson, 1943).   
 Beginning in the spring of 1940, officer candidate schools were established all 
over the country, similar to what was constructed in the First World War.  These were 
called reserve midshipman schools, and consisted of a month of sea duty, followed by a 
three month period of instruction (BoN, 1941).  The V-7 program was formed to help 
funnel college graduates into these reserve midshipman schools.  The V-5 program would 
place graduates into reserve flight programs.  The V-1 program included working with V-
7 or V-5 candidates who would pay for college at their own expense.  Originally, a two- 
year college degree was required for admittance to the reserve midshipman school.  
However, the Navy changed the policy to a four-year college requirement, which cut the 
failure rate in the midshipmen schools by fifty percent (Navy V-12, 1996).       
 A formal declaration of war had not yet been made, therefore the regular Navy 
grew at a much slower pace.   All of these new officers from NROTC and OCS were 
entering directly into the reserve Navy (BoN, 1940, 1941).   As early as 1939, the Naval 
Academy could not meet expanding fleet requirements, even with an increase in the 
number of midshipmen (Lovell, 1979).  NROTC graduates began to take an increasing 
number of staff corps billets in the regular Navy, leaving the Academy to fill expanding 
line billets (BoN, 1939).  By early 1941, graduation was accelerated by four months, and 
the Academy once again moved to a three-year program (BoN, 1941). 
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C. THE TRANISTION OF THE OFFICER ACCESSIONS DURING WORLD 
WAR II AND AFTERMATH (1941-1949):  ROTC AND OCS GAIN A 
PERMANENT FOOTHOLD IN THE REGULAR NAVY   
World War II, and its immediate aftermath, altered the Navy’s officer 
procurement system to closely resemble that of today’s Navy.  The Naval Academy 
ceased to be the sole commissioning source either in peacetime or war.  The two main, 
closely related factors that led to this change were education and mass mobilization.   
The idea that officers should be well-educated was firmly established prior to 
World War II.  However, the swelling of the ranks with non-Academy graduates during 
the war created a varied landscape of naval officers.  Officers now came from a diverse 
background of educations.  At the time, the perception was that civilian institutions 
would generate creative and free-thinking officers, thus reducing the authoritative traits 
typically found in the Academy graduate.  Some wanted this diversity to be continued 
after the war, even at the expense of the service academies themselves (Holloway Plan, 
1945; Masland and Radway, 1957).    
The effects of mass mobilization were highly significant to the accession 
programs during this time period.  Between 1939 and 1945, the Navy officer corps had a 
phenomenal growth rate of 2,600 percent (DoD, 1997; BUPERS, 1960).  Despite massive 
growth, the Navy did not revert back to its original size due to a new threat from the 
Soviet Union.  The Navy departed from its historical pattern of growth and reduction, and 
never came close to downsizing to its pre-war strength.  The Navy officer corps remained 
approximately 400 percent higher than its pre-1939 strength, ending the cycle of 
demobilization following full-scale war. 
Subsequent to World War II, it was determined that the traditional method of 
transitioning a large naval reserve into a war-time Navy was no longer fast enough to 
counter a possible invasion.  The threat of invasion or attack from the Soviet Union led to 
the idea that a large peace-time navy was now required to deter an attack on the United 
States (Lyons and Masland, 1959).  With this mode of thinking, it was clear that the 
Naval Academy was no longer able to meet the manning requirements to maintain a large 
peace-time Navy.  Therefore, the Navy became dependent on ROTC and OCS, in 
addition to the Naval Academy, for manpower.   
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1. The Second World War 
As the most lethal and devastating war in world history, World War II required a 
huge naval force to fight the Axis forces in the Atlantic and Pacific, as well as a large 
number of officers to lead it.  Half of the nation’s income, and a vast portion of its 
population and resources, were diverted to meet the challenge (Masland and Radway, 
1957).  Hastily commissioned officers and millions of draftees rose to the occasion and 
performed the same jobs that regular Navy personnel had completed on a much small 
scale prior to the war.  The Navy utilized OCS, direct enlisted commissions, and, to a 
much lesser extent, ROTC, in order to reach such a massive level of growth in the officer 
corps. 
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the immediate growth came from the 
activation of the Naval Reserves.  The active officer corps immediately doubled in size, 
and the Navy’s foresight in creating the reserve OCS and ROTC programs paid off.  For 
example, NROTC produced over 2,000 officers who entered the service immediately.  
Many advocates of the ROTC program hail this achievement as a path for success in the 
war because of the immediate manpower pool provided (Lyons and Masland, 1959).  
However, the 28,000 officers of the active Navy at the time immediately following Pearl 
Harbor was only a fraction of the 317,000 officers the Navy would have by 1945 
(BUPERS, 1949).  Throughout the war, reserve midshipmen schools (later OCS) would 
by far play the largest role in providing officers.   
When America entered the war, there were three main ways to become a 
commissioned officer in the line:  USNA, ROTC, and OCS.  OCS consisted of two types 
of schools:  reserve midshipmen schools, and officer indoctrination schools.  The V-1, V-
7, and V-5 programs were responsible for providing the OCS officers with enough 
military education to enter the reserve midshipmen schools for commission (Navy V-12, 
1996).  The indoctrination schools took established civilian professionals from every 
vocation and shaped them into line officers.  Such schools existed previously in the Navy, 
but were only for staff officers in the medical and chaplain corps.  Indoctrination school 
graduates would receive further education in a warfare specialty before active operational 
duty afloat.  Officers were also procured from the enlisted force, but many were 
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encouraged to participate in the variety of available OCS educational programs in lieu of 
a direct commission (Thompson, 1943). 
A major obstacle to the educational commissioning programs was the lowering of 
the draft age to eighteen in November, 1942.  Individuals who might have entered college 
and become officer candidates were now being drafted directly out of high school.  The 
Navy’s smaller war-time reserve programs, the V-1 and V-7, were allowed to keep their 
students, but the draft ultimately curtailed a major contribution of the ROTC to the 
wartime effort (Lyons and Masland, 1959).  The Navy did, however, recognize that the 
draft was reducing the pool of potential officer candidates.    
In March of 1943, the Navy established the V-12 training program at 131 local 
colleges and universities.  The program was made more efficient by combining the 
NROTC, V-1 and the V-7 programs, and ensured a flow of students through college who 
were compatible with the selective service board.  The V-12 program provided a very 
minimal college education to officer candidates.  However, it was enough to aid 
graduates in the more specialized training they would receive as officers at the 
midshipmen schools. 
  Because the NROTC program was created by a specific law in 1926, it was 
allowed to keep its identity.  Additionally, some V-12 graduates were allowed to 
complete their degrees under the ROTC program (Navy V-12, 1996).  ROTC graduates 
could earn their commission into the regular Navy after a year of service, thus enabling 
them to continue as career Navy following the war (Smith, 1942).  Because they were 
deemed successful, the V-12 program, and the naval aviation V-5 program, allowed for 
the survival of NROTC after the war (Lyons and Masland, 1959). Over all, 60,000 
officers graduated from the V-12 program and went on to reserve midshipmen school.  
Five thousand of those graduates continued on to full time ROTC programs (Navy V-12, 
1996).   
The success of the war manning effort, like World War I, was highly dependent 
on the organization and production of students at the nation’s Officer Candidate Schools.  
The roles of both the Naval Academy and ROTC respectively were reduced due to the 
very nature of their respective curriculums.  Both programs have a lead time of four years 
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in order to produce officers.  The unpredictability of threats and warfare often does not 
give such lead time.  The Naval Academy did not have the resources or ability to 
dramatically increase the size of its graduating classes.  The ROTC, with its lead time 
requirements, also could not meet a rapidly fluctuating bill of manpower requirements.  
Only an Officer Candidate School can be increased or decreased at a moments notice to 
meet the spectacular speed of mobilization following a Pearl Harbor scenario, or the mid-
1943 leveling of officer requirements after the bulk of the build-up.  In the debate as to 
which entity can produce officers quickly and efficiently enough to meet Navy 
requirements, the successes of the Officer Candidate Schools particularly in WWII, 
outweigh the Naval Academy and ROTC.  The various OCS schools do not require much 
lead time, and are relatively easy and inexpensive to run (Lyons and Masland, 1959). 
The debate over whether or not to maintain a Naval Academy was brought into 
question after observing the successes of the OCS program. In 1943, Secretary of the 
Navy, Frank Knox, named a board headed by RADM William Pye (from the 1919 board) 
to consider two questions:  (1) Should we combine the service academies into one 
institution, providing the first two years of education, then have our candidates finish 
their education at a civilian institution?, or (2) Should we close the Naval Academy 
altogether?  The Pye board rejected both notions.   
Instead, the Pye board came up with a completely different conclusion.  The 
Naval Academy, even with twice the pre-war capacity, could only produce 1,600 ensigns, 
or half of the 3,200 ensigns required every year.  Despite that fact, the board 
recommended that the Naval Academy continue as the primary commissioning source 
after the war.  However, the remaining junior officer billets would be supplied by Naval 
Reserve Officer Training Units in civilian colleges and universities.  To achieve this, the 
best V-12 programs were being converted back to NROTC units, and plans were made to 
establish a total of 50 NROTC units (Lyons and Masland, 1959).   
2. Post-World War Two Transition and Requirements 
At the war’s end, the future of the military and the officer accession programs lay 
in a field of uncertainty.  After a successful European campaign, the Army desired a “one 
military” concept, modeled after the unified commands established in Europe.  
Additionally, questions about unified military officer training or individual service 
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training, either at a service academy, at a ROTC unit, at an OCS unit, or a combination of 
all three bounced around the services.  The role of these commissioning programs, for the 
active forces or the reserves, was questioned as well (Lyons and Masland, 1959). 
The Navy was not prepared to wait for the government to make a decision.  As in 
previous wars, the role of the Navy underwent another major transition.  The war in the 
Pacific emphasized the importance of strong, flexible naval power.  The Navy was no 
longer confined in the establishment of blockades, patrolling or supplying colonies, or 
guarding supply lines to Europe.  The Navy had participated in a major war, which 
directly and destructively attacked the enemy’s land and sea forces.  With its newly 
established mission, the Navy did not want its Marine force absorbed into the Army or its 
naval aviation arm absorbed into the new Air Force.  In an effort to maintain the separate 
identity of naval power, the Navy opposed unification early and provided a 
counterproposal to ensure that the three services remain separate (Lyons and Masland, 
1959). 
a. The Holloway Plan 
The Holloway Board, and the subsequent Holloway Plan, forced the Navy 
to plan for the future of the Navy accession sources, including the possibility of 
unification.  The purpose of the board was to address the future of the officer corps, and 
weigh the effectiveness of the commissioning sources.  After the war, Annapolis was 
among the most firmly established institutions in American society.  The Academy had 
deep roots in history, sustained by rich traditions and customs, and was maintained by an 
intensely loyal body of graduates (Masland and Radway, 1957).  However, the Academy 
could not provide enough ensigns to meet naval requirements, and other officer sources 
were required.  The Holloway Report, named after the Board’s Chairman, Rear Admiral 
James L. Holloway, was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on October 30th, 1945.  
The Holloway Board became known as the foundation of Naval Officer training (Lyons 
and Masland, 1959).   
The board began its work by addressing trial balloon plans such as the 
Jacobs-Parker plan, which would require all officer candidates to attend NROTC for two 
years, followed by three years at the Naval Academy.  The Board felt that this particular 
plan would disrupt the four-year pattern of education at a single institution, and “would 
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eliminate intra-service differences to only a minor degree (Holloway Plan, 1945, pg 3).”  
The board eventually dismissed all of the trial balloon plans. 
The Board recommended positive training, equal opportunity in promotion 
and responsibility, and equal designation among officers.  Further, and most importantly, 
it recommended adjusting “the supply of permanent commissioned officers taken into the 
Navy so that approximately one-half come from the Naval Academy and one-half from 
other sources (Holloway Plan, 1945, pg 3).”  Additionally, the board rejected the 
proposal of building a second Naval Academy, or any other action that would weaken the 
esprit or discipline produced by the traditional Naval Academy experience (Lyons and 
Masland, 1959). 
The board operated under the premise of the Pye report, which stated that 
the Naval Academy would remain the primary source of officer accession, supplying 50 
percent of the yearly accessions.  The Pye Report continued that the remaining 50 percent 
would be procured from the NROTC programs in civilian colleges and universities.  
Students in the “regular” ROTC (later known as Scholarship ROTC) would be selected 
prior to entering college, and receive the cost of tuition and books, as well as a monthly 
stipend.  After two to three years, the ROTC graduates would be commissioned into 
either the active or reserve Navy.  The arrangement was two-fold.  It would provide the 
necessary amount of junior officers in the active force, while reducing the proportion of 
officers embarking on a permanent career in the Navy.  Further, the reserve force would 
have a steady supply of officers with fleet experience (Masland and Radway, 1957). 
The Holloway Plan, which seemed to affirm the Pye Report, provided a 
clever answer to the critics of the service academies who felt that a civilian college 
education would produce a less technical and less authoritarian officer.  Instead of 
training the entire officer corps at one institution, the plan diversified the Navy by 
enabling officers to be educated at either the Academy or a civilian institution.  By 
broadening the range of officers, the plan met the demands of critics without altering the 
traditional role of Annapolis (Masland and Radway, 1957).  In addition, the Navy began 
educating new officers on the interrelations of the Navy with other military services.  
New officers were taught how the various services work together and compliment each 
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other.  This cooperative effort appeased critics who felt that academy graduates continued 
to play the Army-Navy game throughout their lives (Lovell, 1979).  
The Holloway Plan was fully consistent with the Navy’s position against 
unification, and Secretary Forrestal and Admiral Nimitz prepared to fight for its adoption.  
The Army was bitterly opposed to the plan, however, and desired unified training.  The 
Army could not afford ROTC programs of the same caliber as the Navy, and feared that 
it would not attract the best officer candidates.  The Navy insisted that the education of 
naval officers was inherently different to the training of army officers and anything less 
than the Holloway Plan would prevent the ascertainment of postwar officer requirements.  
Congress finally passed the Holloway Plan in July of 1946.  Despite heavy pressure to 
veto, President Truman, after much personal lobbying by Secretary Forrestal, signed the 
plan into law (Lyons and Masland, 1959).   
b. The Implementation of the Postwar Programs 
Although signed into law, the Holloway Plan did not guarantee the future 
of any naval commissioning source for any significant amount of time.  The following 
year, amidst the debate of the National Security Act, the unification issue was again 
brought up by Congress.  Many Members of Congress complained that the dual service 
academies obstructed inter-service cooperation, and caused unnecessary duplication.  The 
respective services restated their determination to preserve the institutions, based on two 
arguments:   
1. The academy graduates exemplified the highest ideals of the service, which set 
the standard in professionalism, personal character, loyalty and service to country for 
other personnel. 
  
2. The academies were known quantities, virtual magnets for officer candidates who, 
in large numbers, graduate and serve as career officers (Masland and Radway, 1957).  
  
The fight to establish an Air Force Academy brought the Naval Academy 
into question again in 1949.  Prior to leaving office, Secretary of Defense Forrestal 
established the Service Academy Board, which would decide how, and if, to manage the 
service academies.  The Air Force desired a reliable source for officers.  The Army and 
Navy, however, sought to retain their full output of respective graduates to meet their 
own service needs.  Critics felt that unification of the service academies provided the best 
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solution to prevent duplication and save money.  The five civilian educators on the board 
rejected unification regardless of whether Annapolis or West Point could expand to 
support the Air Force, and recommended three separate service institutions (Masland and 
Radway, 1957). 
In August, 1949, the new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, tried again 
to dissolve the service academies.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a powerful 
argument in favor of three separate service academies.  They felt the service academies 
well prepared their students for career service and were worth the cost.  The argument, 
with the full endorsement of the three service secretaries, defeated five proposed 
alternative plans to change the service academies (Masland and Radway, 1957). 
The Naval Academy successfully survived many attempts to close its 
doors following the conclusion of the war.  With a vast pool of reserve officers from the 
drawdown, the Naval Academy and ROTC managed with ease to supply all active line 
officers in 1946 and 1947.  However, the even split of the Holloway Plan is short lived.  
In 1947, OCS is resurrected in the form of the Naval Aviation Cadet (NAVCADS) 
program (DoN, 1947).  By 1949, this precursor to Aviation Officer Candidate School 
(AOCS) is producing 30 percent of the line officers.   
D. THE COLD WAR AND THE MODERN ARMED CONFLICTS (1949-1992) 
The Cold War continued to assert the necessity for a large peacetime Navy.  A 
large Navy would continue throughout this period, with three main build-ups:  Korea, 
Vietnam, and President Reagan’s 600 ship Navy.  The Naval Academy, ROTC, and OCS 
would simply expand or decrease their numbers based on necessity.  In this era, Officer 
Candidate School was resumed, and became known as the Naval Cadet program.  The 
modern day Officer Candidate School and Aviation Officer Candidate schools were 
permanently formed in 1955 and 1959 respectively. 
In response to Soviet aggression, new technologies were quickly developed in the 
fields of radar, jets, atomic weapons, submarines, and rocketry.  In addition to new 
weaponry, and contemporary leadership and management techniques, the military found 
itself working directly with other nations, managing occupied territories, and mobilizing 
a massive amount of troops.  Many military professionals in the Cold War Navy now 
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understood that education was the key to capitalizing on new technologies and managing 
mounting responsibilities (Lovell, 1979). 
1. The Korean War and Aftermath 
  The swift attack on the Republic of Korea proved the theory that rapid 
deployment of reserves, prepared for mobilization, was no longer feasible.  As the United 
States hastily entered the war, the Navy had no time to reestablish officer candidate 
schools as it had during the Second World War.  Time constraints made it impossible to 
increase USNA and ROTC production, so the Navy turned directly to the enlisted 
community for commissioned officers.  Between 1952 and 1954, 60 percent of 
commissioned officers came directly from the enlisted force (BUPERS, 1952-1954).  As 
a result, the Navy established permanent Officer Candidate Schools to meet future needs. 
  The NROTC program remained steady, and kept its fixed number of fifty-two 
units.  The Navy retained its ROTC program as a small, stabilized organization.  The 
Army and Air Force increased the number of cadets in their respective ROTC programs, 
despite the long lead time for the classes entering between 1950 and 1952.  This created 
large officer classes from 1954 through 1956.  Most of the heavy fighting occurred in the 
first year of the war, and the war was over by 1953.  Therefore, the Army arranged to 
accept only 60 percent of each class into active duty, while the remaining 40 percent 
entered the reserves (Lyons and Masland, 1959). 
Following the Korean War, the Navy began to focus heavily on the education of 
officers.  In 1956, only 56 percent of the officer corps possessed a bachelor’s degree 
(Thirtle, 2001).  Certainly, this was due in part to the heavy reliance on the enlisted 
community during the Korea War.  The formal educational institutions of the Naval 
Academy and ROTC continued to foster intellectual development, and prepare graduates 
for a career of service.  Officer Candidate School, a vital instrument during wartime, was 
only to be relied upon in peacetime when the principal sources failed to meet 
requirements (Masland and Radway, 1957).            
The inability of the respective academies to meet service requirements during the 
Korean War, and a West Point cheating scandal in 1951, did not strengthen the case for 
service academies in general.  Fiscal concerns also mounted, as the pricetag of the 
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Korean War increased, and the construction of the Air Force Academy loomed.  
President Truman was so livid regarding the cheating scandal that he considered 
appointing a Presidential Commission to evaluate the need for the service academies and 
the proper education of career officers in a democratic society.  Further, commissioning 
sources other than the Naval Academy were producing a greater share of officers 
(Masland and Radway, 1957).  During the Korean War, the Naval Academy could only 
produce six percent of the annual requirement of officers (BUPERS, 1952-1954).     
President Eisenhower won the White House in 1953, and secured an armed peace 
in Korea.  He also protected the service academies.  The new administration required a 
draw-drown of forces, (Lyons and Masland, 1959 ) so the Navy simply lowered the 
number of candidates entering Officer Candidate School.  President Eisenhower’s pro-
military, pro-academy stance led him to secure legislation to authorize the construction of 
the Air Force Academy in 1954.  This stance also led the Naval Academy graduates fill 
up the ranks of the Navy again.  By 1957, the Naval Academy reached a student 
population of 3,700 students (Masland and Radway, 1957).    
2. Vietnam Conflict and the Reagan Naval Expansion  
The Vietnam Conflict, and the major naval build-up of the 1980’s, required an 
increase in officer production.  The pipeline for new officers was already in place, and 
needed only to be increased.  ROTC production was slightly elevated, and OCS 
enrollment was increased.  The enlisted community was no longer needed to provide 
direct commissions for officers.  Virtually all enlisted commissions into the line 
community were produced from the three major commissioning programs, with the small 
exception of the Naval Enlisted Science program, which was established in 1969.    
During this period, the Naval Academy climbed to an approximate student 
population of 4,400, which remained steady until the end of the Cold War.  The Naval 
Academy’s share of officer production dropped during the Vietnam War and the Reagan 
build-up, as OCS was used to meet fleet demands.  However, the Naval Academy saw an 
overall increase in its share of officer production throughout the entire period.  This was 
mostly the result of a reduced demand for officers by the end of the Reagan 
Administration.  Also, the Naval Academy increased its graduation rate over this period.  
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The attrition rate was generally in the 30 percent range in the 1970s and dipped to the 20 
percent range in the 1980s (General Accounting Office [GAO], 1992a). 
E. THE POST COLD-WAR ERA AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 
(1992-PRESENT):  THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF OFFICER 
COMMISSIONS 
Once again, a cheating scandal, and various other serious conduct violations 
brought the Naval Academy before Congress to determine the necessity of the institution.  
The cost of commissioning officers from the Naval Academy, and their performance in 
the fleet, were brought into question.  Arguments were heard on both sides of the issue, 
and will be addressed later in this thesis.  In this period, naval forces were drawn down, 
and the Academy was reduced to 4,000 midshipmen.  OCS experienced the most 
immediate reduction.  In 1993, it produced only 13 percent of the officer corps, as 
opposed to 47 percent seven years earlier (BUPERS, 1986; BUPERS, 1993).     
As the officer population dropped from 70,000 in 1990 to 52,000 in 2004, the 
population of the Naval Academy did not significantly decrease.  On the contrary, in 
2003, the Navy requested that the Academy be increased by 100 midshipmen a year in 
order to bring the Naval Academy back to a Cold War level of 4,400 midshipmen.  Over 
the past fifteen years, numerous studies have been conducted on the respective 
commissioning sources with regard to economics and job performance.  Many of these 
studies favored the service academies, which influenced the increase in enrollment.  
These studies will be analyzed later in this thesis.     
  History will continue to compare and scrutinize the military and commissioning 
policies of the three post-Cold War U.S. Presidents:  George H.W. Bush, William 
Jefferson Clinton, and George W. Bush.  The previous two administrations chaired the 
majority of the drawdown following the Cold War and choose to reduce the size of the 
Naval Academy, but stayed out of the fray with the numerous congressional 
investigations into the service academies’ scandals. 
  The current administration signals a very pro-Naval Academy stance.  President 
George W. Bush unofficially endorsed this stance with giving a key 2005 Global War on 
Terrorism speech and hosting the 2007 Annapolis Mid-East Peace Summit at the Naval 
Academy.  His 2003 Academy population increase will unquestionably continue to raise 
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the proportion of Naval Academy graduates in the fleet.  Additionally, in 1997, a 
commission of inquiry was created by the Center for Strategic and International studies to 
evaluate professional military education.  Soon to be Vice President of the United States, 
Richard Cheney, chaired the commission, and stated that eliminating the service 
academies would jeopardize the nation’s defense and eliminate the base of all 
professional military education (Cheney, 1997).   
The continuing Global War on Terrorism and the economic and military 
development of other nations such as India and China will no doubt play a major role in 
the future of the commissioning sources.  Recently, the Naval Academy expanded the 
number of Marine Corps billets from its graduating class to aid in the War on Terror in 
Iraq.  China continues to develop a “blue water” Navy, which is seen as an attempt to 
challenge the supremacy of the United States over the world’s oceans.  Finally, fiscal 
constraints caused by budgetary crises such as the solvency of Social Security and 
financing the growing National Debt will continue to raise questions regarding the 
necessity of the service academies.  It is likely that all of these issues will have a 
significant effect on the future of the Navy’s commissioning sources. 
Finally, as technology continues to develop in the information age, it will further 
reduce the demand for manpower in general.  Even though civilian outsourcing and 
joint/international operations will require more officers for oversight, the trends signal for 
extended officer careers rather than more officer accessions (Mehay, 2007).  As pointed 
out during this chapter, technology continues to influence manpower requirements.   
The Naval Academy, ROTC and OCS remain the current commissioning sources.  
All work to support the collaborative pursuit of specified goals.  As the requirement for 
officers continues to decline, questions arise as to whether or not the commissioning 
sources will be able to meet their established goals.  Perhaps the goals need to be 
readjusted in order to ensure their survival (Scott, 2003). 
If it is decided to eliminate a commissioning source, there will be an exhorbitant 
amount of dissent from the numerous members and alumni of each program.  Members 
of an organization often have a vested interest in the survival of the organization.  
Preservation of the organization is critical, and members and alumni make it a priority to 
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protect and strengthen it.  Originally, the Naval Academy had the largest and strongest 
alumni ties and loyalty. However, all three commissioning sources have now existed 
continuously for almost seventy years.   All three sources now have thousands of 
graduates who may wish to see these respective organizations protected, if not 
strengthened (Scott, 2003).   
F. HISTORICAL DATA 
Figure 1 depicts the historical proportion of officer accessions into the active duty 
unrestricted line Navy from fiscal year 1845 to 2005.  The figure compares the 
percentages from each of the three main sources of the US Navy (USNA, ROTC, and 
OCS), while taking into the account the contribution of the enlisted force.  The enlisted 
numbers are direct commissions only and do not account for the enlisted members who 
enter the three major commissioning sources which started in 1914.  Subsequent to the 
Korean War, most enlisted desiring commissions into the active line Navy had to enter 
through OCS, ROTC, or USNA.  Figure 2, the annual officer population of the Navy, 
depicts how quickly the Navy grew and declined in periods of peace and war  
The objective of the illustration is to compile a broad picture regarding naval 
commissioning sources over time.  Before 1949, official numbers were not directly 
reported every year.  However, the Bureau of Navigation or the Secretary of the Navy 
mentioned officer procurement in almost every annual report to the President and 
Congress.  These Navy reports proved essential in the estimation of where commissioned 
officers came from.  Unfortunately, the World War II data is not readily available since 
the annual reports were classified during the war.  However, a host of other sources 
allowed for estimation during the war.  From fiscal year 1949 forward, the annual report 
from the Bureau of Naval Personnel or the Department of Defense provides this 
information.  The illustration is the author’s best attempt to paint a picture of 
commissioning sources as part of the Navy’s commissioning equation.  
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Figure 1 Citations:     
1. 1845-1861: Karsten, 1972 and Simons, 2000. 
 
2. 1861-1865: Estimate from Karsten, 1972, Simons, 2000, and DoN, 
1865.  Based on a 600% growth of the US Navy Officer Corps between 1861-1865 from 
DoD, 1997. 
 
3. 1866 – 1897: Karsten, 1972, and Simons, 2000. 
   
4. 1898 – 1899: Estimate from DoN 1898, DoN 1899. 
 
5. 1900 – 1916: Estimate from DoN reports from FY1900 through FY1916, 
Karsten, 1972, and Simons 2000. 
 
6. 1917 – 1920: Estimate from DoN 1917-1920, Lyons and Masland, 1959.  
Based on a 700% growth of the US Navy Officer Corps between 1917-1919 from DoD 
1997. 
 
7. 1920 – 1941: Estimate from DoN 1926, Bureau of Navigation Annual 
Reports FY1930 through FY1941, Lyons and Masland, 1959. 
   
8. 1942 – 1948: Estimate from USNA output from BUPERS, 1960.  Based 
on the 2700% growth of the US Navy Officer Corps from 1941-1945 and the following 
drawdown from 1945-1948. 
 
9. 1949 – 1958: Data from a time series graph from BUPERS Annual 
Manpower Report, 1958.  Gathered from the same source as Lyons and Masland, 1959 
and verified accordingly as the book. 
 
10. 1959 – 1993: Data from BUPERS Annual Manpower Report, FY1959 
through FY1993. 
 
11. 1994 – 1996: Estimation through interpolation. 
 
12. 1997 – 2004: Data from DoD Population Representation in the Military 
Services, FY1997 through FY2005. 
  
 
Figure 2 Citations and Notes: 
1.  Department of Defense, 1997. Selected Manpower Statistics for FY 1997. 
 
2.  WWII officer manning rises to a peak of 317,000 officers on active duty by 
FY1945.   
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There is much information to be gleaned from Figure 1 and Figure 2.  First, the 
Naval Academy has been the primary source of naval officers during times of reduced 
officer requirements, such as peacetime.  Secondly, in every circumstance, when the 
demand for officers increases, the proportion of Naval Academy graduates to fill the 
demands decreases.  The GWOT is the first war in history in which the Naval Academy 
has even seen an overall increase in production compared to the other sources.  However, 
this is due to a steady reduction in the overall amount of required naval officers.  Thirdly, 
the graph shows an overall positive slope for the last 50 years for increasing Naval 
Academy accessions.  Conversely, the graph shows an overall negative slope for officer 
personnel for the same time span. 
Further, the fourth point is that ROTC, while continuing to provide a four-year 
education, has proven essential in keeping the post-WWII Navy manned.  Fifth, due to 
the accessibility of the WWII commissioning programs which provided college 
opportunities, there was little need to tap the enlisted pool for officer candidates.  Sixth,  
because the WWII-era OCS schools were closed down with the Holloway plan, enlisted 
personnel were directly tapped to fight as officers in Korea.  This led to the permanent 
establishment of OCS.  Seventh, the graph displays the significant role played by OCS 
and Direct Enlisted Commissions during national emergencies.  Finally, today’s officer 
population is only 4,000 to 7,000 members shy of the inter-war population between 
WWII and Korea, in which the Navy initiated the Holloway Plan.  These figures raise the 
obvious question as to whether three separate commissioning sources are either justified 
or sustainable. 
G. SUMMARY AND REVIEW 
The following are lessons learned from the past with regard to how accession 
programs have evolved over time.   
1. Aristocratic Argument, Technology and Education Argument, and 
the Need for Rapid Expansion    
This chapter highlights the development of capable, educated officers to handle 
the rapidly developing technological advances of the time period.  These new advances, 
and the need for officers who could manage them, were key in the establishment of the 
Naval Academy and eventually ROTC, while requiring more college background for 
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OCS.  Originally, higher education could only be afforded by the upper classes.  Thus,   
the naval officer corps was considered an aristocratic organization.  Over the last century, 
as primary and secondary education improved and became more accessible, non-
aristocratic individuals broke down barriers by attending the Naval Academy and other 
colleges and universities.  World War II greatly accelerated this advancement, as the 
Navy desired educated officers.  The Navy decided it would even pay for it if necessary. 
In the current Information Age, technology will only continue to demand highly educated 
officers. 
The requirement for rapid expansion set the precedent for an Officer 
Commissioning School in times of national crisis.  OCS remains because of its ability to 
quickly churn out officers.  ROTC was originally designed to provide more educated 
officers during periods of rapid expansion.  However, it was quickly overwhelmed during 
WWII.  Despite its limitations, naval leaders appreciated ROTC’s ability to deliver 
officers from diverse educational backgrounds with four years of naval training and 
cultivation.  ROTC earned a strong endorsement from the Holloway Plan, which made it 
a permanent fixture in the Navy. 
2. The Naval Academy:  The Foundation for the Officer Corps 
The Naval Academy serves as the foundation for the officer corps, which is the 
bedrock upon which professional armed forces are built.  At the conclusion of each major 
conflict, the nation has turned to the Naval Academy to provide educated officers. As 
officer requirements dwindled, the Naval Academy provided the greater share, if not all 
of the Navy’s officers.  Whenever the Naval Academy has been unable to meet the 
demands of the service, the nation turned to other available sources.  ROTC, which 
provides fully educated officers, has proven to be the preferred alternate to the Naval 
Academy.  In times of crisis, the nation has also turned to both OCS, and the enlisted 
force, to meet demands. 
3. Sociological Insights:  Established Organizations 
The Naval Service is now quite accustomed to acquiring officers from each of the 
respective commissioning sources, and has been for over 80 years.  Naval policymakers 
would face critical resistance and opposition, both internally and externally, to any effort 
to end one of these institutions. The organizational fight for survival cannot be 
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discounted. It would prove easier to allow these institutions to modify their 






III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
This analysis compares the results in prior research studies on the performance of 
the graduates of the three major commissioning programs.  This “product analysis” will 
help decision-makers determine the value of each institution based on the success of their 
respective graduates in the fleet.  Navy accession policy, and the standard used in this 
analysis, is to procure officers with the highest potential for success in the service.  The 
definition of success for future naval officers is those candidates who can become 
excellent leaders in the art of warfare (Parcell, Hodari, and Shuford, 2003).  Each of the 
three commissioning programs shares this procurement goal.  This chapter will compare 
the relative performance of officers from each program. 
Determining performance, in terms of officer accession programs, can be 
difficult.  Traditionally, it has been measured in terms of retention and promotion (GAO, 
1992b).  More recent studies, utilizing fitness reports and surveys, have looked at the 
success of graduates from each commissioning source at their follow-on training or their 
actual execution of duties in the fleet.  In the civilian world, most studies have used salary 
or earnings to determine employee on-the-job productivity, since economics assumes that 
workers are paid the value of their marginal productivity (Bowman and Mehay, 2002).  
However, because all military officers in the same grade receive the same pay, analyses 
of military performance cannot use pay to gauge productivity.  Instead, by studying the 
retention, promotion, training, and fleet performance of sample candidates, we can 
examine the quality of the commissioning source from which they come (Bowman and 
Mehay, 2002, Wise, 1975b).  The following sections address each of these indicators. 
A. RETENTION 
Retention has always been a managerial challenge for military leadership and 
civilian organizations (Korkmaz, 2005).  When an employee separates from an 
organization, costs are usually incurred related to the separation.  Because the disruption 
caused by separation is costly, organizations focus considerable attention on the problem 
(Clemens, 2002).  
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1. Civilian Studies 
Hundreds of studies have been conducted in recent decades on the effects of 
turnover in organizations.  One major study conducted in 1986 by Cotton and Tuttle 
gathered over one hundred published, quantitative turnover studies between 1979 and 
1984.  This meta-analysis categorized the determinants of turnover into three categories: 
external, work-related, and personal.  The report then analyzed the data to statistically 
summarize the gathered information.  The results of the study uncovered over 26 
variables from the three categories that had a definite impact on retention.  Among the 
variables, education was found to be a positive and highly significant predictor of 
turnover.  That is, more highly educated employees are more likely to leave (Cotton and 
Tuttle, 1986).  This presents a problem for military decision-makers; they spend money 
to develop highly educated officers, but cannot keep them in the service.      
2. Military Studies 
For the Navy, because of its hierarchical personnel system, personnel separations 
have a much greater impact on organizational performance and stability than separations 
in a civilian organization.  Middle and senior grade officers cannot be directly replaced 
from the civilian world, but must work their way up from the junior officer ranks.  It 
takes time and money before and after commissioning to produce a qualified officer, not 
to mention the time and money it takes to make an experienced officer.  Additionally, 
personnel separation reduces officer quality, productivity, and recruitment (Clemens, 
2002).  In other words, the same workload must still be completed by fewer personnel.  
Thus, many studies have been completed to see which commissioning source is most 
effective in retaining officers. 
For the purposes of this thesis, studies by Bowman, Mehay and Parcell will be 
analyzed.  Three different studies on commissioning sources by Bowman, Mehay, and 
Parcell have found that USNA is the source with the highest rate of retention, followed 
by ROTC, and then OCS.  These reports look at the number of officers who remain in the 
Navy up to their LCDR promotion board, which is approximately at the ten year point for 
officers.  The premise is that if officers stay to the half-way point to retirement, it is likely 
that they will remain to collect the pension. 
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B. PROMOTION 
While analysts have debated the best measures of work performance, promotion is 
one clear indicator of successful performance.  Salary has been used in the past to 
measure performance in civilian firms, with the assumption that salary reflects 
productivity.  However, while many large organizations base salary on a grade level, 
salaries are often supplemented with longevity pay, bonuses, and stock options, which are 
difficult to compare across firms.  Upward mobility of an individual in the organizational 
hierarchy may be a more accurate indicator of job performance (Wise, 1975a, 1975b).  
As economists continue to develop an understanding of the relationship between 
internal labor markets and promotion, a growing amount of research has looked into the 
role of education.  The specific characteristics of colleges and universities have been 
analyzed to determine the labor market success of their graduates.  Often, the research 
looks at the effectiveness of attending more selective post-secondary institutions 
(Bowman and Mehay, 2002).  The goal of these studies is to analyze if, and why, these 
relationships exist and the labor market value of attending highly selective institutions 
(Wise, 1975a).     
1. Civilian Studies 
Most studies have analyzed the effect of college type on salaries for cross sections 
of workers.  For the reasons stated above, David Wise was one of the first authors to look 
at the effects of college selectivity on worker productivity within a single organization 
(Bowman and Mehay, 2002).  He found that the rate of promotion increased with college 
selectivity (Wise, 1975b). 
2. Military Studies 
Unlike the civilian world, the Navy organizational hierarchy provides a unique 
micro-level database with which to explore the effects of college selectivity on job 
performance (Bowman and Mehay, 2002).  Large civilian organizations vary greatly in 
promotion requirements, precepts, and promotional timing throughout the company.  The 
Navy, however, has an established hierarchical structure and personnel system, and set 
promotion requirements which are established by the Defense Officer Personnel 
Management (DOPMA) Act of 1980. Due to this structure, a study of Navy job 
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performance can take place in a controlled environment with regard to climbing the 
career ladder, job assignment policies, and incentives (Schirmer, et al., 2006). 
In this section, this thesis will compare various promotion studies conducted on 
the three major commissioning sources.  The Navy spends a great deal of money on the 
commissioning of officers.  Therefore, the study will analyze whether these investments 
enhance worker productivity.   
C. FITNESS REPORT EVALUATIONS 
As stated above, promotion rates within the military are a satisfactory 
measurement of performance because officers enter a level playing field directly after 
graduation.  Annual work appraisals, better known as Fitness Reports or “FITREPS” will 
be discussed in the data section.  FITREPS are used by Navy commanders to grade the 
job performance of their subordinates.  FITREPS are utilized by the entire military, thus 
enabling researchers to compare these reports in any manner they choose.  In this report, 
we will compare the FITREPS of Navy officers from each of the three respective 
commissioning sources. 
While FITREPs are undoubtedly a very acceptable method of comparison in 
determining success, they are not without criticism.  FITREPs are subjective and 
localized.  They tend to have overtly inflated written reports and scores with little 
variation among recipients.  However, the FITREP has very rigid rules on ranking within 
a command.  The highest ranked individual(s) will receive a “recommended for early 
promotion” based on the amount of performers under the commanding officer.  Even 
though the commanding officer alone makes the subjective decision on ranking, many 
organizations would rather use subjective promotion guidelines over objective promotion 
guidelines (Bowman and Mehay, 2002).    
D. FLEET QUALIFICATIONS 
After commissioning, graduates from the Naval Academy, ROTC, or OCS 
prepare for their jobs in the fleet with follow-on training.  Types of follow-on training 
include attending either flight or nuclear power school, or earning your warfare 
qualification on-board ship.  As all officers must complete some type of follow-on 
training to earn their warfare qualifications, this period is a constant in performance 
studies (Mehay and Bernard, 2003). 
45 
The cost of follow-on training for individuals in the aviation and submarine 
communities outweighs the actual commissioning costs for those graduates.  For 
example, the post-commissioning cost of training an officer to become a pilot or Naval 
Flight Officer (NFO) is ten times more expensive than commissioning the same officer at 
OCS.  Additionally, the cost of flight school for a Naval Academy graduate is five times 
more expensive than the graduate’s Academy education.  Attrition during these critical 
time periods is costly, particularly as training concludes.  A significant goal of the 
commissioning sources is to have their graduates succeed in follow-on training 
(Bowman, 1995). 
The “command at sea” screen is another qualification worth studying.  For the 
purposes of this study, the screen will be considered a qualification instead of a 
promotion.  Officers who obtain positive early FITREPs often receive highly sought after 
jobs.  Superior performance in these jobs often leads to what is considered a “command 
path”.  An individual on this command path can often be identified as early as the rank of 
mid-grade lieutenant.  Acquiring key jobs and positions makes them competitive for 
screen boards.  High performers are pitted against others who have not received such 
competitive positions.  Promotion boards accept and promote officers to higher ranks, 
regardless of whether or not they are on the command path.   
E. PRIOR STUDIES 
1. Bowman (1995):  Retention and Promotion   
In 1995, William Bowman developed a model to determine the cost-effectiveness 
of the three major commissioning sources.  The overall results of his report will be 
discussed in the economics analysis section of this thesis.  The measurement of output 
will be discussed in this section.  Bowman’s output model was based on maintaining a 
“steady state flow” of officers in the fleet.  He analyzed the number of newly 
commissioned officers required to replace those who left active duty.  Bowman analyzed 
retention and promotion rates in order to determine the flow of officers from each 
commissioning source needed to “man the rails” of a hypothetical force structure. 
The analysis used two data sets based on the Officer Data Card and the Officer 
Loss File, which are databases maintained by the Navy Department.  A total of 37,717 
officer records, representing all of the active duty URL population who entered the Navy 
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between 1985 and 1994, were merged, and then used to analyze retention to the 
respective O-4, 0-5, and 0-6 boards.  The author addresses the selection bias arising from 
officers separating from the Navy prior to a promotion board, which would work against 
Naval Academy graduates.   Only the best ROTC and OCS graduates stay in to compete 
for promotion boards.  This is not true for Academy graduates, since the primary function 
of the institution is retention.    
The Bowman model uses non-linear (probit) regression models of retention and 
promotion to estimate the independent effect of accession source from personal 
demographic characteristics and undergraduate schooling factors.  Some of the additional 
factors included a graduate’s major, grades, and science and mathematical background.  
For ease of presentation, the estimated coefficients of the accession source variables are 
presented in Table 1.  They are the estimated effect of each commissioning program on 
the probability of retention and promotion for each URL community; the effect of being a 
graduate of ROTC or OCS is compared to being a Naval Academy graduate.   
As illustrated by Table 1, the retention and promotion rates of Navy Officers vary 
significantly by commissioning source.   For all URL officers, ROTC graduates are 6.2 
points less likely to stay to the O-4 board than USNA graduates.  OCS graduates are 14.9 
points less likely to stay than USNA graduates.  When analyzed by community, the Naval 
Academy had significantly higher retention rates than the other two commissioning 
sources, except in the NFO community, in which there was no significant difference.  
With regard to the higher ranking boards, the only significant result for URL officers was 
that, compared to the Naval Academy, OCS had a 6.5 point lower probability of retention 
to the O-6 board.  The bottom line is that most officers who stay to the O-4 board will 
stay until their 20 year retirement.   
In addition, Bowman estimated in Table 1 that Academy graduates promote at 
significantly higher rates than ROTC and OCS graduates.  On the O-4 board, compared 
to their Naval Academy peers, ROTC graduates were 6.5 points less likely to promote, 
while OCS graduates were 3.4 points less to promote.  The O-5 board revealed that, 
compared to Naval Academy graduates, ROTC promoted at 9.9 points less and 15.5 
points less for OCS.  The O-6 board results showed that ROTC was 5.1 points and OCS 
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was 7.8 points less likely to promote than USNA graduates.  When dissected by 
community, the overall results were similar, although the coefficients for aviators were 
insignificant.  
 
Table 1. Estimates of Probability that Graduates of Officer Commissioning Programs Will 
Stay on Active Duty to a Selection Board and Promote on “First Look”  
(Compared to Naval Academy Graduates) 
URL SUB SURFACE PILOT NFO  
ROTC OCS ROTC OCS ROTC OCS ROTC OCS ROTC OCS 
RETENTION: 
ENS TO LCDR 
LCDR TO CDR 
































ENS TO LCDR 
LCDR TO CDR 
































* = 90% significance 
** = 95% significance     
 
2. Mehay (1995):  Retention, Promotion, Fitness Reports, and Training  
The purpose of this study was to analyze differences in measured performance 
between minority and majority officers.  The goal was to analyze the direct and indirect 
effects of race and ethnicity on observed performance.  The study examined the job 
performance indicators of retention, promotion, fitness report evaluations, and Surface 
Warfare qualifications for junior officers.  The study looked at the Promotion Board 
History Files (1985-1990), and merged them together with fitness report history files for 
each officer prior to each board at which he/she appeared.  The analysis matches 
productivity models with multivariate analyses and includes controls for Navy 
background and experience factors, as well as demographic characteristics (Mehay, 
1995). 
The analysis of retention and fitness reports examined a population of 9,777 
officers and the study of qualifications examined 3,959 Surface Warfare Officers 
(SWO’s).  The promotion analysis included only 4,471 officers who remained in the 
Navy and were reviewed at the O-4 promotion board.  The time period limits any 
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fluctuations from the 1991 Gulf War and the Post-Cold War drawdown.  With the binary 
dependent  variables – retention,  promotion,  and SWO pin qualification – multivariate 
probit models are estimated with maximum likelihood techniques.  In the fitness report 
analysis, ordinary least squares techniques are used, since the dependent variable fitness 
report score is continuous. 
Table 2 shows that ROTC and OCS graduates were generally less likely to retain, 
to promote, to achieve SWO qualifications and tended to score lower on FITREPs 
compared to USNA graduates.  ROTC graduates were less likely to retain to an O-4 
board compared to a Naval Academy graduate, but the coefficient was insignificant.  
OCS graduates were less likely to retain to an O-4 board and this effect was significant.  
ROTC graduates were less likely to promote, while OCS graduates were less likely to 
promote compared to USNA graduates.  These results were significant.  The fitness 
report analysis showed ROTC graduates received 8.8 percent fewer early promotion 
recommendations, while OCS graduates received 9.6 percent fewer such 
recommendations compared to USNA graduates.  Finally, ROTC graduates were 20.1 
points less likely to receive their SWO pin, compared to a USNA graduate.  There were 
no significant results on SWO qualification for OCS graduates.  In his conclusions, 
Mehay states that colleges vary in their resources, facilities, and quality, and that these 
factors determine the quality of education and skills the graduates receive, which 
ultimately affects career success (Mehay, 1995). 
 
Table 2. Summary of Basic Results from Mehay (1995) (ROTC and OCS compared to 
USNA Graduates)  
ACCESSION 
SOURCE RETENTION PROMOTION 
FITNESS 


























 Mehay, 1995;   t-statistics in parentheses 
 * = statistical significance 
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3. Mehay and Bernard (2003):  Retention and Promotion 
The purpose of this study was to examine the various commissioning programs, 
providing a framework for defense leaders to make decisions on future accessions.  These 
decisions inevitably include formulating the optimal “mix” of officers from each of the 
respective commissioning sources.  As with the other models, this report utilizes the 
retention of graduates from the three commissioning programs, as well as promotion to 
the 0-4 board.  However, a major difference with this study is the separation of ROTC 
Scholarship and Contract students.  Scholarship students receive funding for their full 
tuition, but owe four years active duty.  Contract students receive funding for their naval 
science courses only, but only owe three years active duty.     
 The analysis looks at 17,134 URL officers and their promotion board results 
between fiscal years 1986 through 2001.  This information is gleaned from a database 
built from Officer Data Card information and promotion board results.  Multivariate non-
linear logit models of retention and promotion are developed to estimate the effectiveness 
of the respective commissioning sources, controlling for other determinants such as 
academic background and achievement. 
Retention rates for ROTC Scholarship, ROTC Contract, and OCS graduates, as 
compared to USNA graduates, are shown in Table 3.  It shows that ROTC-Scholarship 
and OCS graduates are significantly less likely to continue in the Navy to O-4 than 
USNA officers – 9 percent and 17 percent less likely, respectively.  There were no 
significant retention differences between ROTC-Contract graduates and Naval Academy 
graduates.   
 

















     Mehay and Bernard, 2003 
    ** = significant at .05 level 
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Table 4 compares the promotion rates to O-4 for the three commissioning 
programs.  Table 4 shows that ROTC-Scholarship graduates are 8.1 percent less likely to 
be promoted than USNA graduates at the overall URL O-4 board, significant at the .05 
level.  The only other results at this significance level were ROTC-Scholarship graduates 
were 9.0 percent less likely to promote in the Surface community and 6.3 percent less 
likely in the Aviation community.  But, on average, for the entire URL, there were no 
differences in promotion between ROTC Contract and the OCS programs, as compared 
to USNA (Mehay and Bernard, 2003).     
 
Table 4. Summary of Basic Promotion Models (ROTC and OCS Compared to USNA 
Graduates 
















































   Mehay and Bernard, 2003:  A compilation of basic promotion models from Tables 19, 20, 23, and 26.   
   * = significant at .10 level;  ** = significant at .05 level 
   SUB N/A =  No ROTC-C officers remained in service to the promotion board. 
 
4. Parcell, Hadari, and Shuford (2003):  Promotion and Qualification 
This study uses officer accession data to analyze promotion and training.  The 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations requested that the Center for Naval Analysis 
assist in setting officer accession policies which would achieve long-term planning goals 
and aid in predicting career success.  The Navy recognizes that in order to be successful 
in all aspects of warfare, it requires an officer corps of diverse educational backgrounds.   
The study uses probit regression analysis to estimate the effect of accession 
source on the probability of achieving various milestones.  This study looks at promotion 
to O-4, O-5, and O-6, using the URL officer accessions from Fiscal Year 1976 through 
Fiscal Year 1996.  Additionally, the command screen probabilities were analyzed.  The 
results were further broken down into the aviation, SWO, and submarine communities. 
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Table 5 illustrates very little statistically significant advantage of commissioning 
source in promotion boards.  The only significant advantage was at the O-4 promotion 
board.  In the submarine community, USNA graduates were 9.0 points more likely to be 
promoted than OCS graduates.  In the aviation community, USNA graduates were 6 
points and 3 points more likely to get promoted than their ROTC and OCS counterparts, 
respectively.  In the qualification category, Table 5 shows very little significant 
advantage in the command screens, except for the aviation community.  Aviators from 
USNA had a 10 point higher chance of making the command screen than OCS graduates.  
    
Table 5. Summary of Predicted Probability Rates of Promotion (Points). 
PROMOTION QUALIFICATION 
COMMUNITY 




























































  Parcell, Hodari, and Shuford, 2003.  Summation of Tables 5-19 
  Dash represents statistically insignificant.     
  No test results available on the Submarine O-6 Promotion Board .   
 
5. Parcell and Macllvaine (2005):  Training 
The Director of Naval Education and Training (N00T) requested this study to 
determine the cause of a rise in attrition in the NFO pipeline during the 1990s.  NFO 
training is quite costly, and the higher than expected attrition rate made it difficult to fill 
fleet requirements.  The pilot training pipeline was analyzed to determine any significant 
similarities with NFO training.  Additionally, the study tried to determine if a permanent 
increase in recruiting was needed to offset the higher attrition rate.   
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The study gathered the records of 1,639 NFO and 3,538 pilot trainees who began 
flight school between fiscal years 1997 and 2001.  Studying this time period allowed all 
of the candidates enough time to complete the aviation training pipeline, from initial 
aviation pre-flight indoctrination (API) to the completion of advanced training.  The 
study then estimated the probability of attrition with a logistic regression, using 
characteristics such as commissioning source, academic performance, and demographic 
information.   
Figures 3 and 4 show the NFO and pilot attrition rates over this period.   On 
average, in both communities Academy graduates were more likely to complete flight 
school.  In NFO flight school, Academy graduates had an 8.7 point better completion rate 
than ROTC graduates and a 16.5 point better rate than OCS graduates.  In pilot flight 
school, Academy graduates had a 9.7 point better completion rate than ROTC graduates, 
and a 10.0 point better completion rate than OCS graduates. 
The results of the multivariate analysis are presented in Table 6, by presenting the 
marginal effects on the estimated probability of attrition.  The table shows that attrition is 
significantly lower for USNA graduates than OCS graduates in both the NFO and pilot 
training pipeline.  In the pilot pipeline, ROTC students have the highest predicted 
attrition rate.  Based on this analysis, the authors recommended that more USNA 
graduates should be recruited in both communities to ensure production results and cost 
savings (Parcell and MacIlvaine, 2005). 
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Figure 3.   NFO Flight School Attrition 
 




Figure 4.   Pilot Flight School Attrition 
 
Parcell and MacIlvaine, 2005 
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Table 6. Predicted Probability of Attrition from Flight School 
COMMUNITY

















       Parcell and MacIlvaine, 2005.  Summary of Tables 4 and 8. 
    Dash indicates statistically insignificant  
  
F. ANALYSIS 
This chapter examined five different studies on how commissioning source affects 
job performance.  In the tables below, the results of each study are compared against each 
other.  Each source is given a rank based on the result.  The source with the “best” 
performance measure is ranked with a number one, whereas the source with the “worst” 
performance measure is ranked with a three.   
1. Retention 
Table 7 shows the three studies that analyzed retention to O-4.  Each source is 
ranked by the probability of success with regard to retention to the O-4 board.  In all three 
studies, the Naval Academy was ranked as having the highest retention probability.  
ROTC was ranked second across in two studies, with an insignificant result in a third 
study.  OCS fell in third place for two of the three studies. 
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     Compilation of findings in relative rank from each report. 
     - = Insignificant result. 
     * = Only ROTC Scholarship was significant.  ROTC Contract graduates statistically  
       insignificant.   
 
2. Promotion 
Table 8 compares relative promotion probabilities of each accession source for 
four studies.  Bowman found that the Naval Academy was the best source of promoting 
officers to O-4, O-5, and O-6.  Mehay deduced the same results at the O-4 level.  Mehay 
and Bernard’s only significant results were that ROTC-Scholarship graduates had lower 
promotion probabilities compared to their Naval Academy peers.  Parcell only found 
significant results at the aviation O-4 board. 
Table 9 shows similar results when ranking with regards to community.  All the 
tests show that the Naval Academy had a statistical advantage for promotion to O-4, 
especially in the Submarine and Aviation communities.  Only Bowman found statistically 
significant results for the Naval Academy on the O-5 and O-6 board.  The only exception 
to this was the O-6 Aviation board, where both Bowman and Parcell saw no statistical 
advantage in regards to commissioning program.      
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Table 8. Ranking of Commissioning Programs by Probability of Promotion (URL only)      
O-4 O-5 O-6 





Parcell3 Bowman Parcell3 Bowman Parcell3
 
USNA 






































Compilation of findings in relative rank from each report. 
Dash signifies statistically insignificant   
Parcell’s study looked at each warfare community only and not collectively at all URL officers.  Only the aviation 
community had significant results for all three sources.     
 
Table 9. Ranking of Commissioning Programs by Probability of Promotion (Compared by 
Community) 






Parcell Bowman Parcell Bowman Parcell
SUBMARINE: 
USNA 



























































































 Compilation of findings in relative rank from each report. 
 Dash signifies not statistically significant   
 Parcell’s study looked at each warfare community only and not collectively at all URL officers.  Only the 
   aviation community had significant results for all three sources. 
 N/A = Results not available 
 
3. Fitness Report 
Table 10 shows that Naval Academy graduates tended to have better fitness 
reports.  Unfortunately, the author could not find more studies on this performance area.  
However, fitness reports should be highly correlated with promotion results.   
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         Compilation of findings in relative rank from report. 
 
4. Qualifications 
Table 11 shows that compared to ROTC and OCS graduates, Naval Academy 
graduates are more likely to earn their warfare pins.  In pilot flight school, OCS students 
performed better, but the reverse was true in the SWO community.  There were no 
significant results for ROTC graduates in the NFO community.  Additionally, Parcell’s 
command screen study revealed only Academy graduates in the aviation community were 
more likely to make command. 
 















































    Compilation of findings in relative rank from each report. 
 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of prior studies in this chapter concludes that Naval Academy 
graduates tend to have higher performance results in the regular line Navy.  In all four 
categories - retention, promotion, fitness reports and qualifications – Naval Academy 
graduates maintained an edge over their peers from the other sources.  Not all results in 
all studies were statistically significant, but several patterns are clearly discernable.  In 
general, USNA graduates tend to outperform ROTC graduates, who in turn tend to 
outperform OCS graduates.     
58 
There are too few studies that have dealt with overall performance, which detracts 
from the validity of this report.  However, the studies reviewed here analyzed very large 
populations of officers over a lengthy period of time.  Additionally, the authors of the 
various respective studies utilize numerous variables, databases, and methodologies to 
determine the effectiveness of the commissioning sources.  The common thread, 
however, shows a more successful rating for the Naval Academy across a broad 
spectrum, even when academic achievement and other background characteristics are 
held constant.      
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IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
The methodology for analyzing the efficiency of the three commissioning sources 
is based on the “human capital model” – investing in the training and education of 
employees to enhance their productivity and job performance.  In this case, the Federal 
government spends money on education and training.  In return, it expects that its 
investment, in the form of commissioned naval officers, will retain and perform at a high 
level.  This study, however, will not only look at the government’s investment in the 
three major commissioning sources, but also at other educational institutions in which the 
Federal government is investing.          
A. INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION AND TRAINING   
Many studies have been conducted to determine whether or not education is a 
worthy investment.  Over 200 years ago, Adam Smith wrote in Wealth of Nations:  “The 
work which he learns to perform, it must be expected, over and above the usual wages of 
common labor, will replace to him the whole expense of his education, with at least the 
ordinary profits of an equally valuable capital” (Smith, 1764).  Smith’s insight provides 
the backbone of the human capital model.  An investment in human capital should pay 
back the initial costs, and yield a rate of return at least as high as an alternative 
investment of one’s time and money (Kaufman and Hotchkiss, 2000).  Any investment in 
human captial can be analyzed within the framework of investment theory (Becker, 
1975). 
1. Human Capital Theory 
The theory of investment is implemented when an organization decides to invest 
in physical capital to enhance productivity and profitability.  Boosting physical capital, 
including the purchase of computers, machinery, or infrastructure, promises to increase 
profits by cutting production costs and enhancing productivity.  The immediate capital 
expenditure is justified by future expanded profits.  An organization should continue to 
make capital expenditures as long as there is a continued positive internal rate of return.  
The estimated rate of return should be determined in the initial decision process 
(Bowman, 1995).  
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Human capital theory shares the same basic principles as the general theory of 
investment:  an immediate capital investment is justified by future profits.  For example, 
workers invest in themselves by seeking education, migration, health care, and better jobs 
(Kaufman and Hotchkiss, 2000).  Organizations make the decision to invest in their 
employees, which in turn enhances their productivity.  This investment includes the 
education and training of employees.   
Successfully implementing human capital theory in an organization can be 
difficult.  The organization’s primary goal is to provide incentives which will both 
motivate employees and enhance productivity.  At the same time, the organization must 
keep an eye on the market and overall economy to determine productivity levels.  The 
greatest obstacle to successfully implementing human capital investment theory is, of 
course, the ability of employees to voluntarily leave the organization, particularly prior to 
fulfilling the return on the human capital investment made by the organization (Bowman, 
1995).   
2. Rates of Return 
Economists estimate that there are two separate rates of return to college 
education:  private and social.  The private rate of return is the yield on the educational 
investment received by the person or organization making the investment.  The social rate 
of return measures the yield to society from the investment, for example, in a college 
degree (Kaufman and Hotchkiss, 2000).  The cost of educating a commissioned officer is 
mostly paid by the Federal government, which obtains a “private” or internal rate of 
return based on the obligated service of the newly commissioned officer.   Society’s rate 
of return may include a new, highly educated taxpayer whose job includes the defense of 
the nation.  
3. Commissioning Source Costs to U.S. Taxpayers 
The Naval Academy is clearly the costliest venue for commissioning, as the 
Federal government pays for each student’s college education and military training in its 
entirety.  ROTC candidates who attend state-sponsored colleges or universities tend to 
cost less than other commissioning sources because the Federal government does not bear 
the full brunt of the educational expenses.  At state-sponsored colleges and universities, 
state taxpayers pay for a significant portion of the education.  Also, ROTC students who 
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attend private colleges have a small portion of their education paid by private grants or 
endowments, while the Federal government covers the tuition.  ROTC Contract and OCS 
students are responsible for their own education costs, thus costing the government only 
the expense of their military education and training.     
In 1990, Marvin M. Smith analyzed the program cost and performance of officers 
commissioned from sources alternative to the Naval Academy.  As expected, the average 
cost to produce a new naval officer was highest for an academy graduate, followed by a 
ROTC Scholarship graduate, and then an OCS graduate.  Smith acknowledged that he 
based his comparison solely on financial costs to the federal government, and that some 
of the costs of the three commissioning sources are paid in other ways by society in 
general, which he did not study.  For example, he did not attempt to study how state 
taxpayers help defray college expenses for some ROTC candidates. 
The studies in this chapter scrutinize only pre-commissioning costs paid by the 
Federal government.  This does not take into account all costs absorbed by the American 
taxpayer, which greatly skews the actual costs of ROTC and OCS, and makes it difficult 
to calculate the actual cost-effectiveness of these two programs.  At first glance, ROTC 
and OCS appear to be less expensive human capital investments to the Federal 
government than the Naval Academy.  However, with regard to societal costs, state-level 
taxes often factor into the equation.  Despite the fact that the Federal government may not 
be the only investor, it inherits all of the internal rate-of-return when an ROTC or OCS 
student is recruited.  There are clearly societal benefits to all taxpayers, whether they are 
paying federal or state taxes, for educated naval officers.  However, omitting the portion 
that state taxpayers subsidize skews the results in determining which source is the most 
cost-efficient from a social perspective.         
B. FEDERAL COMMISSIONING SOURCE COST STUDIES 
Several studies have attempted to determine the most cost effective methods to 
provide commissioned officers to the fleet.  They use two measures of cost:  average and 
marginal.  The average cost of commissioning a new officer is based on the total cost per 
program divided by the number of graduates.  The average cost is a measure for 
consideration in determining whether an institution should remain open or be closed 
down (Mehay and Bernard, 2003).  The marginal cost of commissioning a new officer is 
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based on how much the total cost changes because of modification in the production level 
by one unit.  The marginal cost is a measure for consideration in determining whether an 
institution should increase or decrease production.       
1. Average Costs 
The average cost per officer for the three programs in 1990 was:  $153,000 for 
USNA; $53,000 for ROTC; and $20,000 for OCS (CBO, 1990).  Since the Naval 
Academy was much more expensive, the CBO report put the Naval Academy’s future 
into question at that time.  Additionally, this cost did not consider the quality of the 
officer each source was producing.    
2. Bowman (1995):  Cost-Effectiveness of Service Academies 
William Bowman (1995) analyzed the cost of different commissioning programs 
in a steady state environment.  His measure of effectiveness is the number of accessions 
required to replace one officer at a given career point [Years of Commissioned Service 
(YCS) = 10].  Bowman derived the required accessions from the published retention and 
promotion rates of each officer community to produce one officer at YCS 10.  This 
accession number is multiplied by the total pre-commissioning and post-commissioning 
costs to provide the discounted lifecycle costs of each source.  The Navy heavily front-
loads its human capital investment, therefore the report expects the Navy will see 
economic returns based on higher longevity and productivity (Mehay and Bernard, 2003). 
Table 12 shows the results of Bowman’s cost analysis in fiscal year 1994.  By 
each community, Bowman adds the pre- and post-commissioning costs of each source, 
and multiplies it by the required accession rate to give the product in the right column.  
The Naval Academy requires the most initial investment:  $111,000 more than ROTC, 
and $150,000 more than OCS.  However, the post-commissioning costs vary depending 
on the graduate’s community with some being quite costly.  For pilots and NFOs, flight 
school training is six times more expensive than a Naval Academy education, and 35 
times more expensive than initial OCS training. 
The last column in Table 12 shows the following pertinent information:  USNA 
graduates were the most cost-effective source for Pilots and Submariners;  OCS graduates 
were most cost-effective for SWOs; and ROTC graduates were most cost-effective for 
NFOs.  In the Submarine Force, for example, Table 12 shows that the Naval Academy 
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graduate is $110,000-$150,000 more expensive to educate, but the long term savings is 
ten-fold.  The Academy saved the Submarine Force $1.4 million compared to OCS, and 
$170,000 compared to ROTC over a ten year period per graduate following 
commissioning.    
 
Table 12. Discounted Lifecycle Costs of URL Officers by Community and Commissioning 

























































































  Bowman, 1995.   
 
Table 13 shows the discounted lifecycle costs from Table 12 in the form of a cost-
effectiveness index ratio.  The Naval Academy and ROTC are compared to OCS 
graduates, with the OCS ratios fixed at the number one.  According to Table 13, the 
Naval Academy was the most costly source per graduate in the Surface community, but 
with little relative difference.  However, the Submarine, Pilot, and NFO communities 
show drastic differences based on accession source.  ROTC and USNA were at least 25% 
more cost-effective in producing aviators and submariners than OCS. Thus, Bowman 
concluded that continuing the Naval Academy, and maintaining ROTC units was the 
most cost-effective method for maintaining a steady state flow of career officers to YCS 
10. 
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Table 13. Cost-Effectiveness Ratios     
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   Bowman, 1995.   
 
3. Parcell (2001):  Optimizing Officer Accession Sources 
This study investigates the Chief of Naval Operations’ request to compare the 
long term costs of an incremental change in accessions from each of the three major 
sources.  The report utilizes two methods in which to analyze the addition of 100 new 
accessions from each source.  The first method uses current retention rates in order to 
calculate the resulting end strength at 20 years of service of an additional 100 USNA 
accessions.  The method then calculates the amount of accessions needed from OCS and 
ROTC to achieve the same end strength.  The second method relies on the same end 
strength level as the first method.  However, it utilizes ROTC and OCS to determine the 
number of accessions needed to achieve the same total end strength over the entire 
period.   
The study calculates the marginal costs of an officer accession based on an 
incremental change in the size of each commissioning program.  The marginal costs per 
graduate were calculated to be $121,000 for USNA, $132,000 for ROTC and $58,000 for 
OCS (Parcell, 2001).  These numbers are based on a 100-officer accession increase.  This 
approach is an excellent method for determining the efficiency of expanding or 
contracting a program (Mehay and Bernard, 2003). 
In order to compare the alternatives, the study makes the assumption that the extra 
officers will be required to ultimately fill senior officer positions.  In other words, these 
extra officers are not being recruited merely to temporarily fill junior officer positions, 
only to be terminated at the conclusion of their initial commitment.  Fortunately, this 
assumption is correct.  As technological advancements continually move forward, the 
demand for experienced URL officers will remain constant (Mehay, 2007). 
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Based on Figure 5, results from the first method show that OCS must access 200 
officers for every 100 produced by USNA.  According to the author, it will cost $0.4 
million less to produce the OCS accessions than the USNA accessions.   However, it will 
cost a total of $54 million more than USNA to produce and maintain the OCS end-
strength distribution. 
Figure 6 shows that, using the second method, accessing 100 USNA graduates per 
year in the steady-state generates 1,103 officers with YCS 0-20.  OCS and ROTC would 
have to produce 120 and 110 officers, respectively, per year in order to maintain a total 
steady-state environment of 1,103 officers.  It will cost $5 million less to produce the 
OCS accessions.  However, bumping up OCS accessions in order to maintain its end-
strength will produce junior officer surpluses and senior officer shortages at a cost of 
about $21 million. 
The study finds that in the long-term, USNA produces the most senior force 
through YCS 20 with the fewest accessions, particularly compared with OCS.  Higher 
USNA success provides the long-term benefit of a less expensive, more senior force.  The 
Naval Academy already has the existing infrastructure from the Cold War, therefore its 
marginal costs are much lower than the other commissioning programs (Parcell, 2001).  
A possible criticism is the results were not broken down by community, which has 
drastically different post-commissioning retention and promotion factors.   
Figure 5.   Number of URL Accessions to Achieve Given Sized YCS 20 Cohort 
  
        Parcell, 2001;    YCS = Years of Commissioned Service 
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Figure 6.   Number of URL Accessions to Achieve the Same Total End-Strength 
 
 Parcell, 2001;  YCS = Years of Commissioned Service. 
     
4. Mehay and Bernard (2003):  An Analysis of Alternate Commissioning 
Programs for Navy Officers 
This analysis is based on the same model used by Bowman, (1995).  However it 
pairs calculations of multivariate models of retention and promotion with the independent 
effect of accession source on these outcomes.  In order to isolate the direct effect of 
commissioning source, other determinants of retention and promotion, such as academic 
background and achievement, are included in the models.  Again, the model of a “steady-
state flow of officers” is used, and the total lifecycle costs are calculated to determine the 
basis for the cost-effective analysis.  Both average and marginal costs are analyzed in this 
report, and ROTC-Scholarship and ROTC-Contract graduates are analyzed separately. 
Table 14 shows the results of the average cost analysis in fiscal year 2002.  As in 
Table 12 above, Mehay and Bernard add the pre- and post-commissioning costs of each 
source, and multiply them by the required accession rate to give the product in the right 
column.  Unsurprisingly, the Naval Academy requires more investment:  $135,000 more 
than ROTC-Scholarship, $175,000 more than ROTC-Contract, and $185,000 more than 
OCS.  The last column in Table 14 shows that ROTC-Contract graduates were the most 
cost-effective source for Submariners and Surface Warfare Officers.  The Academy was 
the most cost-effective source for Naval Aviators.   
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Table 15 illustrates the discounted lifecycle costs from Table 14 in the form of 
cost-effectiveness ratios.  The Naval Academy and ROTC are compared to OCS 
graduates, with the OCS ratios fixed at the number one.  In the respective Submarine and 
Surface Warfare Forces, there was significantly higher value from ROTC-Contract 
graduates, followed by OCS,  ROTC-Scholarship, and finally, the Naval Academy.  For 
pilots, there was better value with Naval Academy graduates, followed by ROTC-
Scholarship, ROTC-Contract, and lastly, OCS.  In the NFO community, there was little 
variation in cost-effectiveness among the sources. 
 
Table 14. Average Discounted Lifecycle Costs of URL Officers by Community and 























































































































Table 15. Average Cost-Effectiveness Ratios  
ACCESSION 


























  Mehay and Bernard, 2003.   
 
Table 16 shows the results of the marginal cost analysis in fiscal year 2002.  As in 
Table 14, Mehay and Bernard add the marginal pre- and post-commissioning costs of 
each source and multiply them by the accession rate which produces the product in the 
right column.  In this analysis, ROTC-Scholarship graduates required more investment:  
$11,000 more than the Naval Academy, $40,000 more than ROTC-Contract, and $74,000 
more than OCS.  The last column in Table 16 shows that ROTC-Contract graduates were 
the most cost-effective source for Surface Warfare Officers.  However, the Academy was 
the most cost-effective for aviators and submariners.   
Table 17 shows the discounted lifecycle costs from Table 16 in the form of cost-
effectiveness ratio.  The Naval Academy and ROTC are compared to OCS graduates, 
with the OCS ratios fixed at the number one.  There was moderate variation in cost-
effectiveness across the board.   For the aviation community, the Academy was 
significantly more cost-effective.  For the submarine force, there was little variation 
between the Naval Academy, ROTC-Contract, and OCS.  However, ROTC-Contract 









Table 16. Marginal Discounted Lifecycle Costs of URL Officers by Community and 














































































































  Mehay and Bernard, 2003.   
 
Table 17. Marginal Cost-Effectiveness Ratios 
ACCESSION 


























  Mehay and Bernard, 2003. 
 
 
C. COMMISSIONING COSTS SUBSIDIZED BY STATE GOVERNMENTS 
AND PAID BY PRIVATE CITIZENS 
As mentioned in the beginning of Chapter four, the studies above analyze only the 
Federal government’s education investment in commissioning candidates in the cost-
effective analyses.  No analysis exists which takes into account the complete societal 
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costs of producing educated ROTC and OCS graduates.  This study attempts an analysis 
of state education investment in ROTC and OCS candidates.  
This thesis assumes the following financial scenario:  Total Annual Revenue 
needed to run an Educational Institution = Revenue financed by students (tuition) + 
Revenue subsidized by governmental support (taxes) + Revenue subsidized by other 
organizations (alumni associations, corporate grants, lotteries, charities, etc.).  This 
equation can be divided by the total number of annual graduates to provide the average 
cost per graduate.  At the Naval Academy, there is no student tuition; however, there is 
some minor support from private grants, as well as the alumni association.   ROTC and 
OCS accessions are funded by state governments and other organizations, but ROTC-
Contract and OCS students are responsible for their own respective college educations.     
In 2007, the State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEO) association, a 
non-profit association of the chief executive officers serving state governing boards of 
postsecondary education, completed its annual study on State Higher Education Finance 
for fiscal year 2006.  The report includes an overview of national trends, and the current 
status of state funding of colleges and universities.  These analyses include the use of 
state tax revenue, non-tax revenue, and tuition revenue to support general education.  
Commissioning candidates who receive ROTC scholarships do not pay the cost of 
tuition.  Therefore, the reader can gather the amount of non-federal subsidies that go into 
supporting the education of commissioning officers (SHEEO, 2007).   
Figure 7 shows the national average cost per Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) student 
compared to the total educational revenue per FTE.  Additionally, these amounts are set 
against the backdrop of a rising student population (SHEEO, 2007).  This figure is an 
excellent way to show the national average of public education support from state 
taxpayers since 1980.  The graph shows the actual Naval ROTC cost paid by the Federal 
government for NROTC students in public schools.  In 2006, the Federal government, on 
average, paid only 36.1% of the actual cost to educate a NROTC-Scholarship student in a 
public school.  The other 63.9% was paid by the state taxpayers and other school 
organizations. 
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Figure 7 illustrates a growth in public school costs throughout the time period.  
Additionally, the support from state taxpayers and other school organizations decreased, 
placing more financial responsibility on the student.  In 1980, a student only paid 20% of 
his total education, but the number grew to 36% over the time period.  This figure is 
important because the ROTC pre-commissioning costs listed in the previous studies are a 
faction of what the actual costs are to the taxpayer.  This fraction depends on the 
breakdown of ROTC students in public and private schools.   
Also, the figure shows that pre-commissioning costs are rising significantly for 
the Federal government (ROTC-Scholarship) or for the future officers (ROTC-
Contract/OCS).  This trend points to both an increasingly more expensive ROTC 
program, and higher out of pocket education costs for ROTC-Contract and OCS 
candidates. 
 
Figure 7.      Non-Medical FTE, Educational Appropriations per FTE, and Total Educational 






 SHEEO, 2007.   
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Figure 8 shows the 2006 average cost of student education broken down by state.  
In the center right, the United States average of 36.1% is listed, which was discussed in 
Figure 7.  However, on a state-by-state basis, the amount of student educational 
responsibility varies greatly.  Students assume very little of the financial burden in states 
on the right of the graph.  States such as Florida, Georgia, California, and Wyoming have 
less expensive tuition.  These states have significantly higher taxpayer subsidies to higher 
education.  For example, 20% of the education bill is paid by the state lottery in Georgia, 
while 18% of the bill is covered by oil drilling and mining royalties in Wyoming.   With 
gambling and oil royalties defraying a significant portion of the education costs in these 
two states, it would be advantageous to the federal government to increase the size of 
their respective ROTC units located there (SHEEO, 2007).   
 
Figure 8.   Net Tuition as a Percent of Public Higher Education Total Educational Revenue 





The costs of ROTC and OCS graduates are less in part because the Federal 
government shares the cost of a fully educated and trained Naval Officer with state 
taxpayers and private citizens.  Most studies of commissioning costs have only looked at 
the Federal government’s portion.  However, state and local taxes, in addition to other 
private grants, share the burden in the education of commissioned officers.     
D. OTHER FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EDUCATION EXPENSES 
The focus now shifts to the educational expenses of the Federal government in 
general.  In the debate of cost-effectiveness of commissioning sources, the previous 
studies looked at the internal rate-of-return of the commissioning sources to the Federal 
government.  There is, however, some Federal education spending which yields limited 
or no return at all.  At this point in the study, the author will highlight some government 
education expenditures other on the commissioning of officers.     
Federal education spending outside of the commissioning sources is extensive.  In 
2002, the total amount of Federal education expenditures was $2.038 trillion.  The total 
amount of Federal money spent on education was $108 billion, or 5.3% of its total 
expenditures.  Of the $108 billion, the share provided to the Department of Defense was 
only 4.4% of the total amount or $4.78 billion.  Figure 9 shows the amount of on-budget 
funds for education by department.   
 










     Synder and Hoffman, 2003 
74 
Figure 10 illustrates federal spending from an educational view.  Almost half of 
the federal education budget supports national elementary and secondary education.  
Only 21% of the total education spending goes to post-secondary education.  This is only 
slightly less than the amount allotted for governmental research. 
   
Figure 10.   On-Budget Funds for Education by Education Specialty, FY2002 











        Synder and Hoffman, 2003.   
 
Federal educational funding ranges from police academies to research, from milk 
money to Pell grants, and from Junior ROTC to flight or medical school for 
commissioned officers.  Often, there are direct Federal subsidies for post-secondary 
institutions, which require no restitution when the education is complete.  These 
programs may, however, provide a social rate-of-return, a question that is debated 
continuously in American politics.   
1. Defense Educational Spending    
The Defense Department receives a very large share of the Federal budget; 
therefore, it is under constant political scrutiny.  As highlighted in Chapter Two, because 
the commissioning sources are recipients of federal educational spending, there is 
constant political debate as to whether or not they should remain.  However, despite the 
amount of attention they receive, they actually only require a small percentage of defense 
spending on education. 
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Table 18 shows the Defense Department spent $4.74 billion on education in 2002.  
Of that $4.74 billion, the Department of Defense spent only $680 million on educational 
expenses for the Naval Academy and Naval ROTC.  This figure represents only 6.9% of 
the total amount of DOD money spent on education.  Many of the programs funded by 
the DOD are vital to the military, such as medical training, aviation schools, and 
primary/secondary education for dependents of service members.  Research, for example, 
is considered a priority expenditure because it provides the military with a technological 
edge over adversaries.  Also, Junior ROTC has been hailed as a success in that it provides 
an internal private rate-of-return by gaining recruits for the enlisted ranks.  These 
worthwhile programs, which require large amounts of money, often remain unnoticed 
when politicians battle over expenditures.     
 
Table 18. DOD Education Costs, 2002 (In thousands of 2002 dollars) 
EDUCATION 





















RESEARCH DOD RESEARCH AT UNIVERSITIES 1,887,978
TOTAL DOD EDUCATION EXPENSES 4,749,222
  Synder and Hoffman, 2003 
 * = Instructional Costs Only:  Academics, Military Training, Physical Training, Libraries, Audiovisual, etc. 
 ** = Includes special education programs; legal education, flight training, advanced degree programs, college 
   degree programs (officers), and health profession scholarships.    
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2. Non-Defense Federal Government Education Expenses 
The Federal government provides educational funding and support for numerous 
institutions in the nation.  However, as opposed to the Naval Academy and ROTC, there 
are very few institutions funded by the federal government in which the federal 
government is also the primary benefactor.    
Two major universities receiving substantial support from the Federal 
Government are Howard University and Gallaudet University.  Howard University was 
founded by Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War as a place at which African-
Americans could receive higher education.  Gallaudet University provides higher 
education to the deaf and handicapped. 
Figure 11 shows the federal budget funds earmarked for education to the three 
main Service Academies, all ROTC programs, Howard and Gallaudet Universities, the 
Merchant Marine Academy, and the Coast Guard Academy.  Howard and Gallaudet 
receive almost the same amount of funding as all five of the service academies combined.  
Additionally, their funding comes close to equaling the cost of maintaining the ROTC 
programs for all three of the respective military services.    
 






























      Synder and Hoffman, 2003.   
 
The three commissioning programs provide the Federal government with an 
internal and the nation a social rate of return.  The internal rate of return is the benefit of 
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commissioned service, while the social rate of return is the education and training of a 
large number of citizens and an educated officer corps.  Howard and Gallaudet 
Universities have a large social rate of return in providing higher education to African-
Americans and the blind, but a more limited internal rate-of-return to the Federal 
government.  The Federal government supports most other historically black colleges and 
universities, as well as handicapped programs, but not to the extent that it aids Howard 
and Gallaudet.   
E. ANALYSIS 
Table 19 summarizes the results of the earlier studies, in terms of the ranking of 
the cost-effectiveness of each commissioning program.  The Naval Academy stands-out 
as the most cost-effective source for naval pilots and NFOs, and in most cases for 
submarine officers.  OCS and ROTC-Contract graduates were most cost-effective in the 
Surface Warfare community.  However, the overall URL analysis by Parcell still ranked 
the Academy as the most cost-effective on average for all URL officers.  
 























































































4 / 2 
3 
USNA – 1 
ROTC – 2 
OCS - *3 
USNA – 1 
ROTC – 2 
OCS – 3 
 * = Ratio shows the largest differential, i.e., more than .25 from the number one rank.  
 Parcell did not break down her results by community, which creates a difficult comparison.   
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F. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of prior studies in this chapter shows that the Naval Academy is 
generally, but not always, the most cost-effective commissioning source.  Even though 
the initial investment is more expensive, the Naval Academy produces officers whose 
performance makes the investment more cost-effective over the long-term. Therefore, the 
Naval Academy provides a high rate-of-return to the Federal government. 
In the aviation community, all three studies showed that the Naval Academy was 
the most cost-effective.  In the submarine community, two out of three studies showed 
the Naval Academy was most cost-effective.   In the Surface Community, ROTC 
Contract or OCS graduates tended to be the most cost-effective.  The Bowman, Mehay 
and Bernard studies illustrate that this is most likely due to the expensive post-
commissioning training graduates go through in the submarine and aviation communities. 
The studies analyzed are not always completely in agreement.  They can be 
difficult to compare due to their different variables, methodologies, and estimation 
techniques.  Parcell analyzed the URL community as a whole, but the other three studies 
broke down the URL into separate officer communities.  The community analysis is 
important with the extremely large difference in post-commissioning costs and pre-
commissioning costs.  Also, Mehay and Bernard analyzed the cost effectiveness of 
ROTC Scholarship and Contract graduates separately, which takes into account the vast 
difference in the initial federal investment.  However, all studies provided clear trends for 
conclusions.       
The Naval Academy, funded in its entirety by the federal government, is the most 
costly of the three commissioning sources on the front-end.  However, the studies show 
that the Naval Academy on average provides the best value for the money spent.   Since 
public school ROTC graduates and OCS graduates have their education paid by the state, 
the potential officer, or by a combination of both, this conclusion is further supported. 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarizes the collected and integrated information from the studies 
of the three different commissioning sources.  Further, it focuses on integrating the 
conclusions and analyses in each chapter.  Each study produces information which is 
useful in building the broader picture.  The summary provides the foundation upon which 
effective conclusions and future recommendations can be made.   
A. SYNTHESIS 
This section summarizes and synthesizes the results and conclusions from 
previous chapters.  Each sub-section lists the main points.   
1.   Historical Analysis 
The historical chapter explored the chronological changes in the Navy’s pre-
commissioning training and education philosophy and policy.  Included in this analysis 
were the factors and events which drove senior policymakers to implement various 
changes over time.  The main findings are: 
• Technology is constantly changing and improving warfighting 
capabilities.  Education of officers is critical in effectively utilizing 
developing technologies necessary to ensure national security.   
• History has shown that the Navy cannot rely solely on officer production 
from the Naval Academy and, to a lesser extent, ROTC, in times of 
national emergency.  OCS graduates and direct enlisted accessions have 
pulled the nation through some of its most critical times.   
• The Naval Academy is the foundation of the officer corps.  It has 
consistently remained the primary source for officer production over time 
and has provided an increased accession percentage in periods of lower 
officer accession requirements.     
• All three commissioning sources are well established in naval, as well as 
American, history and culture.  
2. Performance Analysis 
This analysis compares the performance of the graduates of the three major 
commissioning programs.  This “product analysis” will help decision-makers determine 
the value of each institution based on the success of their respective graduates in the fleet. 
The main findings are: 
80 
• Few studies exist that deal with overall performance.  Also, the studies 
have different methodologies and variables which make it difficult to 
compare them.  However, the studies in this thesis study large populations 
of officers over a lengthy period of time. 
• Not all studies were statistically significant, but clear patterns are available 
for analysis.  In general, USNA graduates tend to outperform ROTC 
graduates, who in turn tend to outperform OCS graduates.  Along the four 
dimensions of performance – retention, promotion, fitness reports, and 
qualifications – Naval Academy graduates maintained an edge over their 
peers from other commissioning programs.     
3. Economic Analysis 
This section of the thesis analyzed the cost-effectiveness of the three 
commissioning sources based on the “human capital model” – investing in the training 
and education of employees to enhance productivity and profitability.  The findings are: 
• Few studies exist that deal with cost-effectiveness.  Also, the existing 
studies have different methodologies and variables which make it difficult 
to compare them.  However, the studies in this thesis study large 
populations of officers over a lengthy period of time. 
• The Naval Academy, generally, tends to be the most cost-effective source 
for officer production in the aviation and submarine communities.  OCS 
and ROTC generally tend to be the most cost-effective programs in the 
surface community.  
• Commissioning source analysis by community allows researchers to study 
the effect of post-commissioning training costs.  The post-commissioning 
training costs tend to be greater than pre-commissioning costs, especially 
in the aviation and submarine communities.     
• Commissioning source cost-effectiveness analyses do not take into 
account that many ROTC or OCS graduates do not have their initial 
educational investment fully paid by the Federal government like 
Academy graduates.  The state government, the graduate, or a 
combination of both provides the initial educational investment.  Thus, the 
ROTC and OCS programs are cheaper to the Federal government, but not 
to the U.S. taxpayer or to the newly commissioned officer.   
• Every officer commissioning sources requires a large initial investment.  
However, the initial service obligation imposed on graduates of each 
source provides an internal rate-of-return to the Federal government. 
• The Naval Academy possesses the physical facilities to offer a student 
capacity of 4,400 midshipmen.  If the actual utilization falls below 4,400, 
the marginal cost per Naval Academy graduate will rise.    
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• The commissioning programs are often placed in the spotlight for Federal 
cutbacks in spending.  However, the cost of educating officers at their 
respective service academies and ROTC programs are only a small 
fraction of the Defense and non-Defense educational appropriations 
currently made by several different federal agencies.     
B. INTEGRATION 
Based on the conclusions above, a set of broader generalizations can be provided.   
1. A Superior Officer Corps for a Superior Navy 
Naval officers have performed adeptly and heroically throughout our nation’s 
history, and continue to do so.  Historically, the Naval Academy has consistently 
remained the primary source for Naval Officers during periods of reduced officer 
requirements.  Due to the physical and educational rigors required to earn a four-year 
bachelors degree from the Naval Academy, and the highly selective process of choosing 
among applicants, it was always commonly assumed by many in the Navy that these 
graduates would outperform graduates from other commissioning sources.  Statistical 
analysis of officer performance data tends to support this hypothesis.     
However, the importance of ROTC and OCS graduates is most evident when the 
Naval Academy cannot meet higher manning requirements, especially during national 
emergencies.  These officers, from diverse backgrounds, have successfully defended the 
nation, often on very short notice.  This is most evident with the need for mass 
mobilization during national emergencies including and following the Civil War.   Rapid 
mass mobilization remains a challenge, especially when reserve components become 
overwhelmed.  
2. Education is Essential for Naval Officers  
The education of naval officers is crucial to the success of the naval service and 
our national defense.  Centuries ago, Naval officer education was determined to be a key 
factor in effectively utilizing developing technologies.  The need for officer education 
began during the “Age of Sail”, intensified during the Industrial Revolution, and became 
critical in the “Nuclear Age”.  With the dawn of the “Information Age”, the importance 
of education has only increased.  Educating Naval Officers is essential in order for the 
Federal Government to fulfill its constitutional duty to provide for the common defense.     
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At times, rapid expansion prevented officers from acquiring an education.  
However, times of peace or lower officer accession requirements allowed the Navy to 
focus financial assets on training and education.  ROTC was designed to diversify 
education and fill expansion requirements, but was quickly overwhelmed by the demands 
of both WWII and the Cold War.  OCS provides officers on a larger and quicker scale, 
but must rely solely on recruitment of college graduates from the work force.      
3. Education is an Expensive Initial Investment, but Yields Substantial 
Dividends 
The initial investment in the education of Naval Academy graduates is expensive.  
It is, on average, less costly to produce ROTC officers who attend private schools than to 
produce graduates from USNA.  It is even less expensive to produce ROTC officers who 
attend public schools because the federal government pays only student tuition, which is 
approximately 36% of the total cost of the education.  The federal government pays 
nothing for the education for OCS graduates because the cost is paid by the officer 
candidate. 
  However, studies show that the Naval Academy, even with its highest initial 
cost, often proves to be the most cost-effective source of new officers in certain URL 
communities.  Naval Academy graduates, on average, were ranked as more cost effective 
than ROTC graduates according to prior studies.  However, the high initial cost has, and 
will always, leave the Naval Academy and other commissioning sources as targets for 
potential cutbacks. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Naval Academy: The Primary Source of Naval Officers 
The Naval Academy has been and will likely continue to be the primary source of 
naval officers.  The Academy is well established in American culture as a premier 
educational institution that selects highly capable midshipmen candidates and molds them 
into high caliber officers.  Academy graduates generally perform at higher levels than 
officers from other commissioning programs and tend to stay in the Navy longer, which 
makes the initial investment in their education cost effective. 
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2. The Navy Must Maintain the Ability to Expand   
Although the Naval Academy meets the core requirements of officer manning, it 
cannot meet the needs of the Navy during national crises when officer requirements rise 
rapidly.  ROTC augments the Academy in providing and overseeing high quality 
education and training, while providing a degree of academic diversity.  Additionally, 
ROTC allows a degree of visibility for the military on college campuses.  A well-
integrated ROTC unit within a student body promotes a positive image of national 
service to other students, thus prompting other students to consider ROTC.  It is 
imperative that OCS be able to recruit as many college graduates as possible, especially 
in a national emergency.  However, the Navy has relied and will continue to rely on 
battlefield enlisted commissions, with their wealth of experience, to meet unfilled 
demands which cannot be met by OCS recruitment.         
3. Education:  Vital to the National Defense   
The large initial capital investment in the education of Navy officers provides a 
large internal and social rate-of-return to the nation.  The cost of educating new officers is 
a necessary expense, comparable to the cost of purchasing a warship, tank, or airplane.  
The nation must have prepared officers in a time of crisis.  Even though the Federal 
government does not pay for the full cost of educating non-Academy graduates, the 
Academy education still tends to be more cost-effective than ROTC and OCS.   
4. Educational Funds 
As stated before, the cost of educating an officer is vital and necessary for the 
national defense.  Thus, officer commissioning programs allow the Federal government 
to fulfill its constitutional duty to provide for the national defense.  However, officer 
commissioning programs continue to be targets for cutbacks. 
  The 10th Amendment specifically delegates non-mentioned items in the U.S. 
Constitution, such as education, directly to the state governments.  Politicians will 
continue to debate federal expenditures on education for the benefit of society at large.  
Federal lawmakers often help state governments, especially in education.  Since officer 
commissioning programs are vital to national defense, they must be fully funded.  
Additionally, service academies and ROTC only account for 0.6% of federal education 
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expenditures.  Policymakers should be prepared to analyze and debate the internal and 
social rate-of-return of these other programs, like the studies mentioned in this thesis.   
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the conclusions, several recommendations can be provided. 
• The Navy should operate the Academy at full capacity.  This will allow 
the Navy to receive the highest value from its investment in the Academy.      
• The Navy should operate all three commissioning sources.  After the 
Academy provides its full share of officers, the difference should be 
shared by the ROTC and OCS programs. These two programs are also 
essential to the national defense and must be defended as such from 
lawmakers wanting cutbacks.  Additionally, all three sources are so 
engrained into American and naval culture that it would be almost 
impossible to remove either one.   
• The Navy should continue to recognize education as essential to national 
defense.       
• The Naval Academy should expand the endowment.  The Naval Academy 
must vastly expand its own endowment and reduce its reliance on the 
Federal budget.  With the costs of the national debt, Social Security, 
Medicare and Medicaid soaring, these entitlements will cause the need for 
cuts in Federal spending.  Since they are relied upon by so many voters, it 
will be much easier for the Federal government to attack non-entitlement 
spending.  Since the Naval Academy has always been in the cross hairs for 
closure, it may become a target for budget cutters again.  The inevitable 
future financial crisis will only add to the pressure to close the Naval 
Academy.  Thus, Naval Academy alumni, after already serving their 
country in peace and war, must be called upon again to ensure the future 
of our national defense by ensuring the future of the Naval Academy.  
Howard University, which began a similar capital campaign almost ten 
years ago, is in the same position as the Naval Academy due to its reliance 
on Federal funding.     
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
For further research, I recommend continuing the investigation of the economic 
and performance comparisons of naval officers based on commissioning source.  In my 
research, there was a limited number of studies that analyze the various performance and 
cost measures.   These new studies should be segmented over career stages, including 
early career (O-1 to O-2), mid-career (O-3 to O-4) and late career (O-5 and above).  
Additionally, a longitudinal study of society, which attempts to measure public 
perceptions, would provide insight on the sociological aspects of the three commissioning 
sources and their assumed social rate-of-return American people.    
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